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1. Introduction 
A key characteristic of large high-technology firms today is that they hold enormous 
amounts of cash. In 2012, for example, Apple held $121bn, Google $47bn, Facebook 
$11bn and Amazon $5bn in cash.3 These firms may have many reasons for keeping 
such cash piles (Myers and Majluf 1984); we will argue that a key reason is the 
importance of R&D to these firms, because it does not involve any bankable collateral, 
has a high degree of uncertainty, and long open-ended time lags, and faces several 
other challenges such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore R&D has to 
be financed with cash rather than capital. 
The R&D-financing issue that these technology giants are addressing with their 
cash piles is a classic problem that historically all R&D-intensive firms have had to 
address. Nowadays, the scale of the cash piles that high-tech firms keep has reached 
enormous proportions. Apple’s cash mountain, for example, is higher than the GDPs of 
tens of different nations. This paper aims to give long-run historical insight into how we 
got here. 
 We examine what R&D spending looked like in the very long run, since c. 1750 
and how, given the substantial financing obstacles, firms have been able to incur large 
R&D outlays on particular, highly uncertain projects. In order to answer this question, 
we explore how we can conceptualise R&D-outlays to understand their long-run 
historical evolution and we investigate what insights we can get into the financial and 
organisational nature of R&D-outlays by looking into particular historical cases, not 
unlike Alfred Chandler (1962), Douglass North (1981) and Oliver Williamson (1985) did 
to examine, respectively, organisations, institutions, and transactions. We also aim to 
get comparative historical insight into the order of magnitude of the costs of these 
                                            
3 Amounts rounded to the nearest billion. “Technology giants at war,” The Economist, 1 December 2012, p. 28. As percentage of annual revenue the 
cash piles were, respectively, 78, 9, 99 and 228 percent, and as percentage of the firms’ market value 22, 5, 21 and 18 percent. 
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particular R&D-projects. 
 These research questions are worthwhile for two main reasons. First, they are 
important because a focus on the long run allows us to see trends and changes that 
are not visible in the short run. Joseph Schumpeter, for example, argued that history 
should be included in the training of all economists. He understood ‘economic analysis’ 
as a combination of history, statistics and theory, and he wrote late in his career that ‘if, 
starting my work in economics afresh, I were told that I could study only one of the 
three but could have my choice, it would be economic history that I should choose.’4 
Innovation studies scholars such as Nick von Tunzelmann (1995), Chris Freeman and 
Luc Soete (1997), and Freeman and Francisco Louca (2001), likewise have studied 
history. Historians and social scientists such as Chandler, North and Williamson use 
history to identify and examine organisational, institutional and transactional change 
that we cannot see if we only examine the short run. So if we want to get deep insight 
into how the arrangements for financing innovation can change and what might drive 
their dynamics, it does not suffice to study the period since the 1990s or even since the 
1970s. We need to go further back in time. 
 Second, historical case studies can offer us unique insights, especially since 
each R&D-project is to some extent, almost per definition a unique, particular case that 
in many respects is incomparable with other projects. Much existing work on R&D is 
based on analysing large data-sets of aggregate annual R&D-outlays with econometric 
methods. In this paper we aim to show what additional insights we can gain by taking 
the project as the unit of analysis and studying particular cases in the long run, in a 
qualitative analytical-historical way following Chandler, North and Williamson’s work on 
the dynamics of organisations, institutions, and transactions. These historical case 
studies can also give us an awareness of changes in scale, time lags and 
                                            
4 Joseph Schumpeter, as quoted in McCraw (2006: 261). 
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organisational forms in the long run. 
 In this paper the project is the unit of analysis, and not the organisation 
(Chandler), the institutional arrangement (North), the transaction (Williamson), or other 
parameters. Following Chandler’s historical case study approach, these cases are 
particular, unique cases as such and are not meant to constitute a representative 
sample. Nevertheless, from these particular cases we can still make some inferences. 
A particular project with large cash outlays, for example, can potentially refute notions 
such as that large scale R&D was not done in the eighteenth century, or that firms in a 
particular country lacked the resources to carry out the largest-scale R&D projects 
(Popper 1935). 
 Besides the historical case study method, we also use economic history 
methods to gain comparative insight into R&D expenditures over time, expressing them 
as GDP-deflated costs, as social opportunity costs and, finally, as fraction of an intuitive 
non-R&D index-case. 
The main empirical evidence we examine is from Britain and the United States 
since about 1750, though we like to emphasize that we do not endeavour to give a 
systematic comparison of R&D in those two countries, for which other papers can be 
consulted (see, for example, Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; Edgerton and Horrocks 
1994). We simply use the two countries to get broader insight into the general finance 
mechanisms. The United States is chosen because it is the largest country in the world 
in GDP-terms since the early twentieth century, and Britain because it was a 
technological leader in many areas until the mid-twentieth century and was never 
occupied during the period examined, unlike Germany, France or Japan. 
 We do not endeavour to give a complete and encyclopaedic review of each and 
every organisational form and institutional instrument that firms adopted. We merely try 
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to review informally some main forms and provide a historical meta-narrative (O’Brien 
2001).  We use a holistic approach and develop a new overarching framework, 
showing how all elements fit together, even if individual elements of this framework 
have obviously been studied previously. This is a work of history that aims to engage 
with the economics of technical change and innovation studies (ETIS). It does not aim 
to be an economic or management study, and not a standard innovation studies paper 
either. 
 This paper aims to contribute to innovation studies by showing how a long-run 
historical perspective, following the tradition of von Tunzelmann and Freeman, can give 
us some additional insights with respect to present-day studies. We return to very basic 
facts about R&D. Our approach is not economic; we focus on practical problems that 
firms faced and show the role of market imperfections. We aim to show how the current 
R&D-financing framework emerged from the past and how the factors we discuss are 
also important for policy and practice and for future experimentation with organisational 
forms and institutional instruments. 
What follows first reviews the most important obstacles firms encountered when 
they wanted to finance R&D. In the next section we first examine growth rates in the 
very long run to identify trends, and then several particular historical R&D-projects for 
which we could trace the total cash outlays. In the subsequent section review several 
organisational forms and institutional instruments that firms have historically adopted to 
overcome the R&D-financing problem. A final section concludes. 
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2. Challenges to the finance of research 
We argue that the financing of R&D is made difficult by five challenges: the presence of 
sunk costs, real uncertainty, long and open-ended time lags between outlays and pay-
offs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. We will discuss these in turn. 
 
2.1. Sunk costs 
Historically, a formidable challenge for R&D-financing has been the fact that costs are 
sunk (Sutton 1998).  Sunk costs are costs that must be incurred to achieve a project’s 
aim, that are incurred once, and that cannot be recovered upon exit. R&D-costs are 
mostly sunk: if the outlays do not lead to a marketable product, little residual value is 
left. Furthermore, R&D costs are incurred ‘internationally’ and do not have to be 
incurred again with the entry of each new market, as is the case with, for example, 
advertising, (i.e. the results of R&D costs, the successful R&D-projects, can be 
marketed internationally) and the results of R&D can to some extent be protected 
against imitation by intellectual property and trade secret law.  
Table 1. Selected generic solutions to the R&D-financing problem, by obstacle mitigated. 
    Obstacle Solutions 
  Inherent factors Sunk costs Staged funding 
Mile stones 
Write-offs 
Options 
Government funding 
    Nested uncertainty Options 
Patents 
Collusion 
Joint R&D 
    Time lags Largest amounts last  
Green lights 
IPO 
Annual write-offs 
  Transactional factors Adverse selection Who initiates (M&A) 
Scientists on board financer 
Personal links / social control 
    Moral hazard Board seats 
Company visits 
Large equity stakes top scientists & 
managers 
Note: The solutions are not mutually exclusive, they were often used simultaneously. The solutions mentioned are examples; they do not form an exhaustive set. 
Source: identified from the literature; see, for example, O’Sullivan (2004), Lerner (2009). 
 
The small residual value of an uncompleted R&D-project also implies that there is little 
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collateral. Given this absence of collateral, given the absence of a cash flow from which 
to make regular interest payments, and given that the sum needed is not precisely 
known ex-ante, banks generally are unwilling to provide loans for R&D. The level of 
sunk R&D-costs differed between industries and varied over time (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982: 85).5 Although precise evidence is lacking, undoubtedly costs of R&D-
projects increased over time and over the course of a technological trajectory. In the 
empirical section below we aim to gain historical understanding of the scale and growth 
of sunk costs in the long-run. 
Technical or generic solutions to the sunk costs aspect of R&D have been 
developed, and most are applied nowadays by venture capital firms (table 1). They 
include funding in stages, whereby initially only a limited sum is committed, until a 
certain milestone is reached that gives more information about the R&D-trajectory, after 
which a decision is made about whether to sink more money, and so on. This is not 
unrelated to the option approach, in which entrepreneurs see an R&D-outlay as the 
buying of a call option allowing them to decide at a later time whether to continue. 
Hartman and Hassan (2006) provide a detailed study on the prevalence of this 
approach in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The accounting practice of immediately writing off R&D-outlays, taking them out 
of existing cash flow, also mitigates the financing problems associated with sunk 
costs.6 They will not have an effect on company financial performance indicators in 
future years, unlike (physical) capital investments: if an R&D-project fails, few write-offs 
have to be made, and this may also help mitigate a sunk costs bias in decision making. 
Government financing of R&D-outlays is another tried and tested solution, prevalent, 
for example, in the defence sector. 
                                            
5 For historical studies of the role of sunk costs in particular industries, see Bakker (2005). 
6 This is mostly the case in the United States since 1974. Some other countries allow the capitalisation of some separable and later stage R&D, and 
firms can write these expenses off over several years; see Lev (1999). 
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2.2. Nested uncertainty 
Uncertainty was an important challenge for the financing of R&D projects. Although we 
cannot measure it exactly historically, we can identify what factors may have increased 
or decreased uncertainty. R&D is almost defined by real (uninsurable) uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). We identify here four types of successive real uncertainty: technical, 
strategic, market and profit uncertainty.7 Technically, it is uncertain whether R&D-
outlays will lead to a working innovation, and if they do whether this innovation is what 
was originally specified or expected. Even if successful in technical terms, the firm 
faces strategic uncertainty, uncertainty depending on the actions of an intelligent 
opponent: are competitors doing similar research and if so, could they launch their 
product first? Even when these two uncertainties are resolved the firm faces market 
uncertainty about whether the market for the innovation remains as it was expected to 
be when the R&D-project commenced. And when the preceding three uncertainties 
have been resolved, the firm still faces profit uncertainty about whether its business 
model is able to capture the value of the innovation. 
The problem of real, uninsurable uncertainty has been poignantly summed up by 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942: 82): “Long-range investing under rapidly changing 
conditions, especially under conditions that change or may change at any moment 
under the impact of new commodities and technologies, is like shooting at a target that 
is not only indistinct but moving-and moving jerkily at that.” Because of real uncertainty 
J. M. Keynes (1936) argued that businesspersons needed animal spirits, hunches, to 
take action and invest in an uncertain world (see also Freeman and Soete, 1997: 242-
264). Pure, extensive and complete rational calculation was impossible and led to 
                                            
7 Technical, market and profit uncertainty can be found back in Kamien and Schwartz (1982: 109-110), who implicitly include strategic uncertainties 
under market uncertainties. See also Lazonick (1991) on productive and market uncertainty. Besides the project uncertainty this section focuses on, 
one can of course also distinguish more general uncertainties further removed from the direct environment of the R&D-project such as wars, natural 
disasters, depressions, financial crises or inflation. 
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paralysis.  
Kenneth Arrow (1962) identifies uncertainty also as one of the three reasons 
why, in his view, the allocation of resources for R&D in an economy is suboptimal at the 
aggregate level.8 Williamson (1985) identifies uncertainty as one of the key three 
dimensions that determine transaction costs; the other two are the frequency of 
transactions and asset specificity, which is the value of the underlying asset outside of 
the particular transactional relation. Clearly, R&D-projects score very low on all three 
dimensions: they are highly uncertain, the frequency of transactions is close to one, 
and they are highly asset specific. 
 Historically, some developments and institutions have mitigated real uncertainty, 
while others have increased it (table 2). The net effect is unclear. Though undoubtedly 
scientific advances, patents and market research have all mitigated uncertainty, the 
constant emergence of new technological trajectories, antitrust laws and the growth of 
highly income-elastic products and services may have increased it. In the United 
States, for example, from the late nineteenth century antitrust laws increased 
uncertainty by preventing collusion, while the resulting merger wave reduced 
uncertainty by taking out and using competitors’ R&D pipelines. Some institutions 
worked both ways: prizes reduced profit uncertainty for the innovator by guaranteeing 
payment for success, and for the prize-financer by setting a maximum payment for the 
innovation; by contrast, they increased strategic uncertainty for innovator and prize-
financer alike, by attracting many competitors to the race. 
 
                                            
8 Indivisibilities and inappropriability are the others. The first is partially dealt with under sunk costs, and we argue scale per se should not matter, 
because if markets for R&D-finance were perfect, firms should be able to undertake R&D-projects of almost any size. We group inappropriability 
under profit uncertainty here because it is a factor in whether a firm will be able to capture the profits of its innovation. Arrow does not explicitly 
address the problems of sunk costs and the time lag. See also Arrow (1983). 
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Table 2. Taxonomy of successive types of uncertainty of an R&D project’s outcome. 
   Type of uncertainty Mitigated by Increased by 
   Technical uncertainty Advances in science and technology 
New techniques that increase 
effectiveness of R&D (e.g. periodic table, 
DNA sequencing) 
Longer time lags 
Option approach 
Decreasing returns within a technological 
trajectory  
   Strategic uncertainty Competitive intelligence 
Product development announcements 
Oligopoly 
Joint R&D; M&A; collusion 
Competition policy 
Prizes 
   Market uncertainty Market research  
Shorter time lags 
Prizes 
Luxury products with high income 
elasticities  
   Profit uncertainty Adequate business models 
Intellectual property rights 
Prizes 
Unstable government policies and 
regulation 
Unstable tax regimes 
Piracy / imitation 
Source: author; see also Kamien and Schwartz (1982); Lazonick (1991); Moser (2012). 
 
Technical solutions to the uncertainty problem included the option approach, in which 
R&D was seen as a process to reduce uncertainty in successive steps, or literally keep 
development options open in the face of competitive threats.  
Collusion has sometimes been an effective means for mitigating strategic 
uncertainty. In interwar Switzerland, for example, the drug firms Hoffman-LaRoche and 
Ciba had a mutually exclusive agreement in which one focused on vitamins, the other 
on hormones. Edgerton (1987) argues that British firms in the interwar period often 
used R&D-projects as bargaining tools when negotiating with competitors. Joint R&D 
projects are another way to reduce strategic uncertainty. Patents, of course, reduce 
profit uncertainty by increasing the costs for competitors to imitate the innovator. 
 
2.3 The time lag 
The ‘roundaboutness’ of R&D, the time lag between outlays and eventual profits, if any, 
is another important challenge to the financing of R&D. We discuss it here separately 
because it was already identified as a key problem by economists such as Joseph 
Schumpeter, Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks, because it is 
historically measurable, and, finally, because firms do take multi-stage time lags into 
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account when making decisions about R&D-financing. 
 Historically speaking the time lag is important, as never before in history did 
firms face such long and uncertain multi-stage time lags and such roundabout 
production as in the period since 1750. It is a unique feature of many modern 
economies that firms are willing to take resources out of the immediate production 
process for many years, only for uncertain benefits in a distant future. One could argue 
that only modern society, a society with modern institutions and modern economic 
growth enabled private firms to deal with these enormous time lags.  
R&D is characterised by a long, multi-stage time lag between cash outlays and 
cash flowing in (Holmstrom 1989). This lag can be divided into the lags between the 
start of research and a proven invention, the proven invention and a working prototype, 
the first prototype and one that can be easily manufactured, the final prototype and 
start of production, the start of production and commencement of sales, 
commencement of sales and revenues coming in, and, finally, incoming revenues and 
profits. At each point a decision is made whether to continue, and successively more 
cash is needed. The exact length of these nested lags cannot be predicted in advance, 
and the external and internal/opportunity costs of cash may vary over these lags. 
The time lag has been noted as a fundamental economic dynamic by 
economists such as Schumpeter, Knight, Keynes, Arthur Lewis and Hicks (von 
Tunzelmann, 1995: 66-67). Schumpeter (1911: 42), for example, noted that “every 
period operates with goods which an earlier period prepared for it, and in every period 
goods are produced for use in the next.” His later observation that long-range investing 
is like shooting at a jerkily moving target (see the preceding section) also underlines the 
importance he attributes to the time lag. Likewise, Frank Knight (1921) noted that 
uncertainty increased sharply as the time lag between product design, production and 
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sales increased, and that the time lag itself was therefore an important challenge for 
entrepreneurs. Keynes (1936: 46) wrote that ‘the entrepreneur has to form the best 
expectations he can as to what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is 
ready to supply them after the elapse of what can be a lengthy period; and he has no 
choice but to be guided by these expectations, if he is to produce at all by processes 
which occupy time.” John Hicks (1973) likewise rejects the notion of a timeless 
equilibrium and distinguishes between a construction phase with no output, and an 
operation phase in which revenues need to cover the sacrifices of the construction 
phase as well as its own output. Long, open-ended time lags make firms reluctant to 
invest, because recalling one’s money is difficult, as cash is not coming in until the end. 
These economists refer mainly to all fixed outlays, while for R&D the roundaboutness 
and thus the time lag’s effects will be even more prominent. 
Given the nature of R&D it is difficult to establish the direction and extent of 
changes in the average time lag. von Tunzelmann (1978), defining it as the time 
between patent application and first commercial introduction, suggests that there is no 
clear evidence that this time lag has been shortening since the Industrial Revolution. 
The time lag for steam engines and related machinery was rarely more than five to six 
years, much lower than for inventions with similar intensity in late nineteenth and 
twentieth century, according to von Tunzelmann (see also Mansfield 1968: 110). What 
has increased is the roundaboutness of the R&D process. During the Industrial 
Revolution inventors and innovators often were the same persons, and this is far less 
likely to be the case today. Over technological trajectories time lags often increased as 
the ‘low-hanging fruit’ disappeared. Examples are the development of catalytic cracking 
(Enos 1962) and the aircraft and pharmaceutical industries during the twentieth 
Gerben Bakker, How firms have financed R&D since the Industrial Revolution, LSE Working Paper, 1-05-2013, p. 13 of 63 
 13 
century.9 
Obviously, the time lag is not fully controllable. Scherer (1967) and Kamien and 
Schwartz (1982: 132) note diminishing returns to the time compression of R&D. The 
more time is reduced, the higher the costs, as one cannot await the outcomes of 
previous experiments before proceeding with new ones. At the Edison lab in the late 
nineteenth century, for example, the time scale of experimentation was enormous. To 
make carbon filament 6,000 different plant species were tried and for the nickel-iron 
battery 50,000 separate experiments were performed (Dodgson and Gann, 2010: 91). 
Generic solutions for the time lag include immediate write-offs of R&D-outlays, 
having a clearly defined ‘green light’ point, at which a decision will be made about 
whether or not to sink substantial amounts of cash, and the IPO for start-up companies, 
which allows investors to cash in before the firm has a positive cash flow (table 1). R&D 
of complex products is sometimes timed so that the critical elements and largest cash 
outlays are made closest to market. Japanese car makers, for example, often develop 
details such as rear-view mirrors and bumpers first and critical elements such as an 
engine last, in order to achieve the shortest time-to-market. 
 
2.4. Information asymmetries 
Besides the three inherent factors, two well-known transactional obstacles inhibit R&D 
financing as a result of information asymmetries between innovator and financer: 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995; Hall, 2002).10 Given 
that historically these factors have been important, since a great deal of historical 
evidence can be interpreted as efforts to mitigate information asymmetries,11 we find it 
important to discuss them here. 
                                            
9 See the U.S. case studies in the next section. 
10 See also Arrow (1962), for an early discussion of these as ‘the moral factor’. 
11 See below. 
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Adverse selection involves hidden information: the financer often can not 
objectively establish the likelihood of a technical venture’s success because the 
innovator is better informed. On average, projects offered for external finance therefore 
have a lower probability of success. To remedy this, the financer is not likely to demand 
a higher stake, because purveyors of the most problematic projects would most readily 
accept such demands. Matters are made more difficult because generally innovators 
will be reluctant to disclose information (Kamien and Schwartz 1982: 28), and this 
reluctance is probably higher for better projects. 
 Generic solutions to adverse selection include investor initiation, in which the 
investor approaches entrepreneurs or firms with promising projects, rather than the 
other way around, a technique also commonplace today in mergers and acquisitions. 
Scientists on the boards of external financers, financing a specific industry, and 
financing with a consortium of informed investors are other tried and tested ways to 
reduce adverse selection. 
 Although historical quantitative indications of adverse selection are difficult to 
come by, Beatty et al. (1995) find that for Research and Development Finance 
Organisations (RDFOs), U.S. legal vehicles that firms can use to finance a particular, 
well-defined later-stage R&D-project externally, the cost of formation is two to three 
times that of ‘seasoned equity offerings of similar size’.12 This suggests very high 
information costs, and Beatty c.s. find that any firm with a sufficient cash flow or pile is 
likely to finance R&D internally and not use an RDFO. 
The second information asymmetry, moral hazard, involves hidden action. Ex-
post an innovator could take more risk than originally agreed and obtain larger profits if 
successful, while the external financiers would bear the additional risk of bankruptcy. 
                                            
12 In effect, the cash-constrained low marginal tax rate R&D firm sells the tax deductibility of its R&D to investors with high marginal tax rates (see 
section 4.1 below for a more detailed discussion). 
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Alternatively, the scientist might choose to maximise fame and recognition by pursuing 
scientifically rather than commercially interesting leads. Financers have often lacked 
the expertise to establish what the innovator was actually doing. Large firms and 
wealthy individuals could alleviate moral hazard more than others because they could 
invest more of their own resources in an R&D-project and so attract outside investors 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982: 85). 
 Again, since we find substantial historical evidence of firms developing ways to 
mitigate moral hazard, this must have been an important problem for the financing of 
innovations historically. For in-house research, solutions to moral hazard included 
individual incentives such as bonuses, combined with large fixed or group payments to 
ensure teamwork continued. Lab architecture has also been important. In the late 
nineteenth century Bayer, for example, designed a new lab architecture by arranging 
the chemists in workbenches laid out in a U-shaped pattern with partitions up to 
chemists’ shoulders (Beer, 1958). This allowed a manager to see what the chemists 
were doing, and communication was possible, while the researchers could still work 
individually and independently. This procedure prevented researchers from pursuing 
their own agenda or leaving the firm with hidden inventions. For external finance, 
generic solutions have included convertible debt, large equity stakes for the key 
scientists, board seats for the investors, and regular site visits. 
 
 
3. Historical evidence 
The five obstacles meant that innovators needed cash, without underlying collateral, 
not capital. No well-functioning market for cash with a law of one price existed. The 
implicit costs of cash differed widely between firms, and market interest rates and stock 
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returns only set a floor under pay-offs investors expected from R&D-projects. Present-
day empirical evidence shows that R&D-outlays are generally sensitive to cash flow or 
cash piles of firms (see section 3.3). 
Given that cash was crucial for R&D financing, and that it generally was tied to 
information, personal contacts or organisational structure when it was made available 
for R&D, the mechanisms that enabled the accumulation of cash and helped it being 
used to finance R&D were important. There simply did not exist a market mechanism 
that could generate cash for any R&D-project with a positive expected value. Little is 
actually known historically about these cash outlays, their size, their scale and how 
they were financed. We aim to gain historical insight by looking at long-run R&D growth 
rates and at historical case studies of R&D-projects in Britain and the United States. 
 Two key reasons why the market for R&D cash did not work were the 
heterogeneity of R&D-projects and the absence of perfect information. The cash could 
only be put out by persons with sufficient knowledge of the technology and organisation 
of a project at hand and this knowledge was not generally tradable. Entry and exit in 
R&D-projects was also complicated. Historically, scholars have argued that firms are 
institutions that reduce transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), mitigate 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1997), solve the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama, 1980), provide an incentive system (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) or 
assign property rights efficiently (Hart, 1995). In addition, firms could be seen as 
institutions that can effectively allocate cash to R&D-projects, by combining it with 
knowledge and monitoring systems. 
An evolutionary positive feedback process in which surviving organisations 
amassed ever larger cash flows and better knowledge was undoubtedly important for 
financing R&D. A long time was needed for such unique organisations to emerge and 
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develop. It only took a few months for a large firm to go bankrupt, but many decades to 
rebuild the R&D-cash allocation function, including the free cash flow and knowledge, 
from scratch. This entropy also implied that upon dissolution of a firm, information was 
lost, sometimes forever, that could not be fully traded or disclosed and sometimes not 
even articulated. This raises intriguing dilemmas for industry policy.  
 
3.1 Long-run growth rates of R&D outlays 
The aggregate effect of an evolutionary cash accumulation process at work should be 
observable in the long-run pattern of R&D expenditure relative to GDP. Before 1900 
little evidence is available on aggregate R&D expenditure, though our R&D-project 
case studies for Britain, below, suggest that it is unlikely that the real growth rate of 
R&D-expenditure was lower than real GDP-growth between the start of the Industrial 
Revolution and 1900. 
From 1910 onwards, several estimates are available for R&D-outlays in Britain. 
These are not derived directly from precisely recorded figures in national accounts or 
censuses of industry, but are best estimates based on surrogate indicators. Given the 
data quality, we focus here on the growth rates of R&D outlays, which may be more 
reliable, informative and comparable, and less dependent on the particular 
measurement concept used, than absolute outlays. It is clear that British R&D outlays 
grew rapidlyalmost five times as fast as GDPin the three decades since 1910, then 
almost eight times as fast during the war, and then six times as fast in the immediate 
post-war period (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Growth rates of real R&D-expenditure in Britain and the United States, c. 1910-2008.
Type Period gR&D/gGDP Source
R&D-exp. GDP
UK
All R&D c. 1910-1938 4.7 1.0 4.7 Sanderson (1972)
All R&D 1938-1945 18.2 2.4 7.7 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1945-1961 13.0 2.1 6.1 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1961-1969 3.3 3.0 1.1 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1964-1998 1.7 2.3 0.7 Von Tunzelmann (2004)
Bus. R&D 1964-1998 1.8 2.3 0.7 Von Tunzelmann (2004)
HE R&D 1964-1998 5.8 2.3 2.5 Von Tunzelmann (2004)
US
BusScientists 1921-1940 12.9 2.9 4.4 Mowery and Rosenberg (1989)
Bus. R&D 1930-1940 1.7 0.5 3.5 Mowery and Rosenberg (1989)
All R&D 1941-1963 11.0 4.0 2.8 Mansfield (1968)
All R&D 1953-2008 5.5 3.2 1.7 Nicholas (2011)
All R&D 1970-1999 3.4 3.2 1.0 Von Tunzelmann (2004)
Notes : R&D refers to real R&D, deflated using the same deflators as for GDP, except for 'BusScientists'.
GDP refers to real GDP deflated using Officer's (2011) and Johnston and Williamson's (2011) GDP-deflators.
gR&D/gGDP' refers to the R&D growth rate over the GDP growth rate. A value of 4.7, for example means that 
R&D-expenditure grew 4.7 times as fast as GDP.
BusScientists refers to the growth rate of scientists employed in corporate R&D labs and is uses for 1921-1940 instead of 
real R&D-expenditure growth, as that data is not available.
HE R&D refers to R&D by higher education institutions. 
Growth rate (%/yr)
 
The high multiples between the 1900s and the 1960s, of five to eight times GDP-
growth, show that the economy managed to allocate ever more cash to R&D-projects 
with a long-run pay-off. More and more resources were taken out of direct production 
and put into long-term roundabout production. The economy developed and used a 
variety of institutions that enabled ever more cash to be sunk in R&D-projects. We will 
discuss these institutions in the next section. 
During the 1960s, the growth of R&D outlays slowed down to about the same 
rate as GDP-growth, and after that both aggregate and private R&D grew substantially 
slower than GDP, while R&D in higher education increased with several times the rate 
of GDP-growth. These growth rates suggest an inverted U-shape of relative R&D-
growth, with R&D growth reaching a peak during the war and slowing down 
subsequently. The period since the 1970s, may have been unique, because for the first 
time since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of R&D-outlays has no longer exceeded 
GDP-growth. 
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For the United States, we cannot reject a similar long-run pattern of R&D 
outlays. Although reliable estimates are missing for the period before the 1930s, the 
growth rate of scientists employed in corporate R&D labs suggests that R&D-outlays 
grew about four times faster as GDP-growth, a figure not out of line with the growth of 
private R&D outlays in the 1930s, and the British relative R&D-growth multiples. The 
estimates suggest that after the war, the relative growth rate slowed down, and that 
from the 1970s, aggregate U.S. R&D was growing about as fast as the economy.  
These data show the enormous scale at which cash historically has been 
allocated to R&D-projects in spite of the major obstacles we noted. R&D outlays that 
grew faster than GDP also showed the increasing opportunity costs of aggregate R&D: 
society was willing to give up an increasing share of its current income to sink into 
R&D-projects with an uncertain outcome at an indefinite moment in the future. 
 
3.2 Historical case studies of outlays on particular R&D projects 
We also have collected historical case studies of particular R&D projects. Case studies 
are important in historical approaches to innovation, and in doing these we follow work 
done by, for example, Alfred Chandler, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson (see also 
the Introduction). In our case studies, unlike many other papers on R&D finance, the 
particular R&D-project is the unit of analysis, rather than other units such as firm R&D 
outlays, R&D-sales ratios, patents, etc.13 
The collection of cases we have assembled is simply that, a collection of case 
studies. We do not claim that they are in any way necessarily representative, and this is 
difficult in R&D-projects anyway, as each R&D-project by definition was unique. We 
should also note that the cost data should be seen as broad estimates and may not be 
                                            
13 For a discussion of expenditure per firm and historical British R&D expenditure in general see Sanderson (1972), Saul (1979), and Edgerton and 
Horrocks (1994). For a historical introduction on the US situation see Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), and Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2007). 
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precisely comparable. Total project costs have been taken from the source. For many 
amounts it is unclear to what extent development and pilot production have been 
included. For some amounts, such as the spinning jenny, it is known that they are for 
the innovation only, for others more costs were included. In the case of the water 
frame, for example, the building of two pilot plants are included in direct costs, making it 
one of the most costly private innovations of its time. The costs in the table should 
therefore be read only as rough indications of the magnitude of expenditures. 
 The costs collected are total costs of the R&D-project in nominal pounds or 
dollars of the time. These costs are then converted into real amounts that are 
comparable over time using three different approaches. First, we correct them for price 
rises of all goods and services by converting the nominal amounts into constant pounds 
or dollars using the GDP-deflator, based on the middle year of the R&D-project’s 
duration (Officer and Williamson 2010). 
 Because the resulting real amounts are not always intuitively easy to interpret 
and compare, we have developed a second way to express project costs, which we call 
the Empire State Index. Officer and Williamson (2010) introduce the Empire State 
Building in New York, completed in 1931, as a good historical costing example of a 
non-R&D project. We therefore use its construction costs as a historical comparator. 
These costs may be intuitively more readily understood than the more ‘abstract’ costs 
of R&D-projects. The scale of the Manhattan project, for example, becomes 
immediately clear, as it amounted to about forty Empire State buildings, making it 
arguably equal to much of the construction value of real estate on Manhattan. To 
facilitate comparisons between Britain and the United States, the Empire State Building 
construction costs have been expressed in British pounds using the 1931 exchange 
rate, so that we also can express the value of British R&D-projects in Empire State 
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Buildings.  
A third method of comparing R&D costs is using their GDP-share. On the 
demand side, the GDP-share shows the opportunity costs to society; it reflects what 
share of income the economy needed to give up for the project (Officer and Williamson, 
2010). On the supply side, this measure ‘corrects’ the costs for national market sizeit 
expresses costs in relation to this market size, assuming that the higher the share, the 
more difficult to extract the finance and resources from the production process. This 
might be a useful heuristic tool as it links R&D costs to the capacity of a growing market 
to generate income that can be sunk into R&D projects. However, it is innocent of the 
fact that as market size grows, the R&D-costs for a given quality level remain the same, 
and for this purpose the GDP-deflator might be better. 
Table 4 shows selected historical cases of mostly successful British innovations 
for which cost data have been located. Project costs and time lags varied substantially 
between projects. Most innovations included were product innovations, though 
chemical innovations often were both product and process innovations, since 
developing a viable manufacturing process was often as difficult as developing a 
compound itself. For the cases presented, cash flow financing was not that important 
until the late nineteenth century 
These anecdotal figures suggest that the sharp growth in R&D expenditure may 
not be something characteristic solely of the twentieth century, but may already have 
started during the Industrial Revolution. For the development cost associated with 
artificial silk, for example, a hundred Hargreaveses could have developed the spinning 
jenny. If this difference was at all representative, it would point to a growth in real 
outlays on a major innovation of 3.6 percent per year between 1767 and 1904, 
compared to a GDP-growth of 2.0 percent. 
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Likewise, for the cost of ICI’s war-time nuclear research, one could pay 26 
Charles Babbages to develop a difference engine. If at all representative, this 
comparison points to a growth rate of real outlays on major government R&D-contracts 
of 2.8 percent annually between 1823 and 1941 compared to a GDP-growth of 2.0 
percent. 
Expressing costs as share of GDP shows project-sizes fluctuating between four 
orders of magnitude, from £1m for the first channel-crossing by plane to £437m for the 
development of semi-synthetic antibiotics. This range is probably not fully 
representative; the inclusion of cases from the aircraft industry and large government-
funded projects would surely increase the range upwards. Yet it does help us to put 
historical project costs into perspective. The Board of Longitude’s ship’s clock project,  
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Table 4. Selected cases of completed R&D-projects and their direct costs and mode of financing, Britain 1736-1957.
Year Innovator Innovation Time lag Category
 GDP-deflated   
(£ of 2005) (% of GDP) (£m 2005) ESI Magnitude (years)
1736 Harrison Ship's clock 1,762,824 0.01730 217 0.0041 2 -20 Prize by Board of Longitude
1767 Hargreaves Spinning jenny 134,824 0.00117 15 0.0003 1 3.5 Angel-rel. ind.
1768 Richard Arkwright Waterframe 1,229,302 0.01021 128 0.0029 2 6 Angel-family; then projectors/VC
1823 Charles Babbage Difference Engine 1,550,312 0.00375 47 0.0036 2 20 Govt. contract
1825 Roberts/Sharp Self-acting mule 1,027,103 0.00248 31 0.0024 2 4 Self-financing; cash flow
1883 Priestman brothers Oil engine 4,233,365 0.00313 39 0.0098 2 11 Cash flow
1885 Cuthbert Heath New insurance policies 700,000 0.00057 7 0.0016 2 3 Angel-family
1903 Napier Car engine plant 2,990,826 0.00167 21 0.0069 2 3 Angel-family; angel-rel. ind.
1904 Lever Brothers Soap mass manufacturing 2,432,432 0.00133 17 0.0056 2 2 Angel-unspecified; cash flow
1904 Courtaulds Artificial silk 17,117,117 0.00934 117 0.0397 3 4 IPO; cash flow+divests. 
1909 Louis Bleriot Crossing Channel by plane 90,090 0.00005 1 0.0002 1 -0.5 Prize by Daily Mail newspaper
1919 Alcock / Brown Transatlantic flight < 72 hrs 381,679 0.00018 2 0.0009 1 -6 Prize by Daily Mail newspaper
1924 Vickers / Air Ministry Airship programme 18,636,364 0.00891 112 0.0432 3 6 Govt. contract; direct govt. R&D
1941 ICI Nuclear research 56,100,000 0.01707 214 0.1302 4 3 Govt. contract
1941 Calico Prtrs / ICI Terylene 99,255,583 0.03340 419 0.2303 4 9 Cash flow
1952 Pilkington Float-glass process 74,766,355 0.02053 257 0.1735 4 6 Cash flow
1957 Beecham Semi-synthetic antibiotics 148,367,953 0.03483 437 0.3442 4 9 Cash flow
Notes : Year is the year that the R&D started, except for prizes, which show the year the prize was awarded. 1885, 1903 and 1904 are estimates based on the historical literature.
Costs are direct historical cash outlays on R&D as documented in the sources and have not been discounted into one net present value using the time lags.
Real direct costs have been calculated using the UK GDP-deflator from Officer (2011) for the mid-year in the project lifespan. Opportunity costs in £m are as percentage of 2005 GDP.
Please note that costs are not precisely comparable. Sometimes development is included, sometimes not, and sometimes building of pilot plants is included, such as in the 
case of the waterframe and soap. Costs in this table should only be used to get an idea of the order of magnitude of R&D-expenditures, in the absence of systematic long-run project
data, and not as exact and fully comparable costs.
For the spinning jenny, Allen's (2009) estimate of direct costs has been doubled to account for Hargreaves' opportunity costs and board and lodging received.
The time lag has been estimated from the sources and should be taken as a ball park indication, especially for the 1885, 1903 and 1904 cases. For the airship programme and the
nuclear research the time lag is simply the length of the research programme.
For the ship's clock Harrison's first successful test has been taken as year, as he received numerous different payments, the first being close to that year.
Angel-rel. ind. = an angel investor from an industry related to the innovator's industry. Govt. = Government
Empire State Index (ESI): expresses the projects costs as fraction of the GDP-deflated construction costs of the Empire State Building (1931) in New York (see text).  
Magnitude: shows the order of magnitude on the Empire State Index, with 1 being the lowest observed order, which is between 1/10,000 and 1/1000 Empire State Building, and 
7 being the highest observed order, which is between 100 and 1,000 Empire State Buildings.
Sources : Allen (2009); Edgerton (1987); Edgerton and Horrocks (1994); Kealey (1996); Michie (1981, 1988); Saul (1979).
Direct cost
Opportunity costs Empire State Index
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Table 5. Selected cases of completed R&D-projects and their direct costs and mode of financing, United States, 1875-1999.
Year Innovator Innovation Time lag Category
 GDP-deflated   
($ of 2005) (% of GDP) ($m 2005) ESI Magnitude (years)
1895 Brush / Carl von Linde Liquefying air 4,863,813 0.00104 131 0.0109 3 10 Self-financing / cash flow
1924 DuPont US rights to Claude process 26,641,294 0.00322 406 0.0595 3 1 Cash flow; patent collateral
1924 DuPont Moisture-proof cellophane 369,159 0.00004 6 0.0008 1 3 Cash flow
1939 DuPont Cellophane process improvements 165,162,455 0.00821 1,036 0.3690 4 11 Cash flow
1946 DuPont Titanium 61,475,410 0.00306 387 0.1373 4 7 Cash flow
1948 DuPont Dacron 40,701,315 0.00181 229 0.0909 3 8 Cash flow
1909 Standard Oil of Indianan Catalytic cracking 1,476,726 0.00027 34 0.0033 2 4 Cash flow
1917 Universal Oil Products Flow cracking process 53,191,489 0.00766 967 0.1188 4 5 Angel-rel.; cash flow, unrel. firm
1918 Oil firm Tube and tank cracking process 5,479,452 0.00082 103 0.0122 3 5 Unknown
1925 Houdry Process Corporation Houdry catalytic cracking 135,970,334 0.01873 2,365 0.3038 4 12 Self-finance; cash flow rel. firms
1929 Standard Oil of New Jersey Purchase IG Farben patent portfolio 329,877,474 0.03376 4,262 0.7370 4 0 Cash flow; patent collateral
1935 Houdry Process Corporation TCC/Houdriflow process 13,387,660 0.00125 158 0.0299 3 8 Cash flow
1938 Consortium of six oil firms Fluid catalytic cracking process 172,612,198 0.01479 1,867 0.3856 4 3 Cash flow 
1927 Lockheed First streamlined aircraft 238,322 0.00003 3 0.0005 1 1 Cash flow
1932 Douglas DC-1 / DC-2 5,804,041 0.00081 102 0.0130 3 2 Cash flow
1936 Douglas DC-3 3,537,736 0.00041 52 0.0079 2 1 Cash flow
1952 Douglas DC-8 652,680,653 0.02560 3,231 1.4582 5 6 Cash flow; govt. subsidy
1952 Boeing B707 186,480,186 0.00731 923 0.4166 4 6 Cash flow; joint with military version
1959 Douglas Electra turboprop plane 408,942,203 0.01480 1,869 0.9136 4 1 Cash flow
1964 Boeing Boeing 747 3,662,109,375 0.09524 12,022 8.1817 5 4 Cash flow
1982 Hypothetical (est. by Boeing) "Large commercial jet" 8,121,277,748 0.13833 17,462 18.1441 6 7 — 
1875 Unknown Mechanical substitute for horses 180,505 0.00012 15 0.0004 1 -3 Prize by Wisconsin legislature
1880 Alexander E. Brown Hoisting machine 1,851,852 0.00097 122 0.0041 2 2 Angel-family
1895 J. Frank Duryea Self-propelling road carriages 108,696 0.00003 4 0.0002 1 -0.3 Prize by Chicago Herald Tribune
1908 Glenn Curtiss Fly a plane for 1 km 40,850 0.00001 1 0.0001 0 -0.3 Prize
1912 A Canadian company S. A. Baker's car heater patent 2,469,136 0.00043 54 0.0055 2 0 Cash flow; patent collateral
1920 Westinghouse Electric Acq. radio patents from E. Armstrong 2,723,735 0.00040 50 0.0061 2 0 Cash flow; patent collateral
1930 RCA Television 73,702,830 0.00852 1,076 0.1647 4 9 Cash flow
1931 Comparative non-R&D example Empire State Building 447,598,253 0.05361 6,767 1.0000 5 1 Bank financing
1941 US Government Manhattan project R&D 648,148,148 0.03185 4,020 1.4481 5 4 Direct govt. spending
1942 US Government Manhattan project pilot plants 17,870,370,370 0.87806 110,838 39.9250 6 3 Direct govt. spending
1961 NASA Manned moonlanding 170,000,000,000 4.42098 558,060 379.8049 7 8 US Government
1961 NASA Apollo launch vehicle engine devpt. 4,367,075,665 0.12873 16,250 9.7567 5 5 US Government
1974 Cray Research Supercomputer 28,007,175 0.00057 72 0.0626 3 4 Venture capital; founders
1976 Genentech Genetic sequencing technology 115,233,090 0.00197 248 0.2574 4 5 Venture capital; founders
1977 Apple Computer Home / personal computer 9,357,861 0.00016 20 0.0209 3 4 Venture capital; founders
1979 Seagate Disk drives 2,431,414 0.00004 5 0.0054 2 2 Venture capital; founders
1982 Lotus Development Spreadsheet software 8,604,945 0.00015 19 0.0192 3 1.5 Venture capital; founders
1982 Genentech H. growth hormone/gamma interferon 83,654,007 0.00127 161 0.1869 4 5 RDFO funding (excubation of finance only)
1983 Ovation Technologies Spreadsheet software 10,416,667 0.00017 21 0.0233 3 1 Venture capital; founders
1987 Multi-firm R&D consortium New microchips 138,504,155 0.00172 218 0.3094 4 7 Govt. contract
1996 Burt Rutan Privately-built spacecraft 10,332,713 0.00008 11 0.0231 3 -8 Prize; angel-unrel. ind. (Paul Allen)
1999 Google Improved search technology 57,623,603 0.00053 67 0.1287 4 4 Venture capital; founders
Notes : Year is the year that the R&D started, except for prizes, which show the year the prize was awarded. For some cases estimates had to be made based on the historical literature.
Costs are direct historical cash outlays on R&D as documented in the sources and have not been discounted into one net present value using the time lags.
Real direct costs have been calculated using the US GDP-deflator from Johnston and Williamson (2011) for the mid-year in the project lifespan. Opportunity costs in $m are as percentage of 2005 GDP.
The costs are not precisely comparable; see the note under table 4.
For the cases of Cray Research, Apple Computer, Seagate and Lotus Development, the costs are the pre-IPO invested cash by founders and venture capitalists.
The time lag has been estimated from the sources and should be taken as a ball park indication.
Aircraft R&D-costs are very rough indicative costs, as civlian R&D was not always seperable from military R&D (the Boeing 707 R&D was partially done for a military tanker version, for example), and because
development expenditures are probably included to a different degree in different cases.
Angel-rel. ind. = an angel investor from an industry related to the innovator's industry. Govt. = Government
Empire State Index (ESI): expresses the projects costs as fraction of the GDP-deflated construction costs of the Empire State Building (1931) in New York (see text).  
Magnitude: shows the order of magnitude on the Empire State Index, with 1 being the lowest observed order, which is between 1/10,000 and 1/1000 Empire State Building, and 7 being the highest observed order, which is between 100
and 1,000 Empire State Buildings.
Sources : Beatty et al. (1995); Congressional Budget Office (2004); Edgerton (2006); Enos (1962); Freeman and Soete (1997); Fried and Ganor (2006); Kealey (1996); Knowledge Ecology International (2008); 
Lamoreaux, Levenstein and Sokoloff (2007); Mueller (1962); Nicholas (2010); Sahlman (1990); Saul (1979); Sutton (1998).
Oil / Catalytic cracking
Aircraft
Other innovations
Direct cost
Chemicals
Opportunity costs Empire State Index
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for example, which cost £217m, had the scale of a twentieth century war time 
government research project, being about as large as ICI’s nuclear research 
programme. Given that over the eighteenth century the Board of Longitude paid over 
seven times Harrison’s amount in total for all kinds of innovations that helped establish 
longitude, total costs were much higher, around £1.5bnabout seven times ICI’s war 
time nuclear R&D. 
For the United States R&D-projects for which cost figures were reported have 
also been located (table 5). As with the British cases, costs are probably not exactly 
comparable and should be seen as broad estimates. Besides varying costs, the nature 
of R&D projects also diverged considerably, as can be seen from the table. In catalytic 
cracking and aircraft R&D a ‘low-hanging fruit’ pattern is visible, with low initial but 
rapidly escalating R&D-costs (Enos 1962). Trajectories seem to have followed the 
colloquial saying that R&D-costs must rise exponentially for a linear increase in 
innovation. 
 Cash flow was the dominant way of financing for the case studies surveyed. 
R&D-projects earlier than the cases in table 5 probably used a greater variety of 
financing methods, as in the British case. Standard Oil of New Jersey’s purchase of IG 
Farben’s non-German patent rights was the largest pre-war project among the cases. A 
major advantage was, of course, that the technology had already been developed, 
meaning that there were fewer sunk costs (as the patents could be sold on), little 
uncertainty and hardly any time lag, adverse selection or moral hazard. In theory, it was 
also possible to use the portfolio as collateral, making financing easier. Though one 
could probably not group the purchase of a patent-portfolio under R&D, it did resolve 
most of the obstacles to financing R&D. Disadvantages were probably the high price 
paid, the considerable knowledge and development costs needed to use the patents, 
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and the fact that somebody had to have already completed the necessary R&D . 
 Costs of R&D-projects could differ enormously, sometimes by several orders of 
magnitude. The R&D for cellophane or for Lockheed’s Vega streamlined aircraft was 
only a few million dollars, measured in GDP-share, while the development of television 
cost over $1bn, the Manhattan Project R&D over $4bn, its pilot plants $111bn, and the 
manned moon landing $558bn. The Boeing 747 cost over $12bn to develop, four 
thousand times more than the Lockheed Vega forty years earlier, and even more if we 
used GDP-deflated costs. These cases show the enormous scale at which firms burnt 
cash on R&D-projects, in spite of the major financing obstacles. 
 The cases since the 1970s that were financed with venture capital show that the 
pre-IPO amounts sunk into these projects were not extremely big compared to R&D 
projects earlier in the century, or even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Key 
differences were that the venture capital-backed projects often developed discoveries 
made in the sharply growing government and university labs and that the projects did 
not yet have positive cash flow before IPO; the IPO itself was a way to get more cash to 
get the project going. It shows how the IPO could be a device to increase project-scale 
by requiring in the pre-IPO stage funding at a similar order of magnitude that had been 
used before for other R&D projects. 
 The cost of the cases in both countries from table 4 and 5 are expressed in the 
Empire State Index (ESI), GDP-share and plotted against their time lag in figures 1, 2 
and 3. The cases varied greatly in size, time lag and character. We should not forget 
that these were particular, unique R&D projects that in many dimensions were widely 
divergent. In addition, over the entire period between the first cases and the present, 
the size of the market increased enormously: in Britain between 1736 and 2010 by 
more than two orders of magnitude, 135 times, and in the United States between 1790 
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and 2010 by more than three orders of magnitude, or about 3,250 times (Officer and 
Williamson 2010). 
From figure 1 the large variation in project costs is immediately clear. Even if we 
cannot be extremely precise given the data quality, we can infer that the real costs of 
these R&D-projects spanned at least seven orders of magnitude, from 1/10,000 of the 
Empire State Building construction costs to 1,000 ESI, the largest projectthe Apollo 
project of the 1960s in this casebeing one to ten million times the size of the smallest 
projectJ. Frank Duryea’s self-propelling road carriage from 1895. In few other areas 
in management and economics do we find such gigantic differences in scale, and figure 
1 gives us a rare opportunity to quantify this degree of variation between the cases we 
studied. It is clear that R&D projects between c. 1750 and 2000 had at least this 
variation, and new cases can only extend the range, not reduce it.  
 It is also clear that eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain was able to 
incur R&D-projects of substantial scalethe ship’s clock, water frame, difference 
engine or self-acting mule having real GDP-deflated R&D costs that were of magnitude 
2 (in the range of 1/1000 ESI), similar to the R&D costs of car engines or soap in early 
twentieth century Britain, and to those of the DC-3, or the first catalytic cracking 
process in the United States. These early British cases, even though they are only a 
handful, reject the notion that pre-twentieth century society was unable to incur large-
scale R&D projects. 
Using our second measure, expressing R&D-costs as GDP-share (figure 2) 
rather than using the GDP-deflated ESI index, increases the relative importance of the 
early British cases. Compared to the size of the economy, the development of the 
ship’s clock was a truly gigantic project, of an order of magnitude comparable to the 
R&D costs of the Manhattan project, the Houdry or fluid catalytic processes, or the  
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Figure 1. Real costs of selected historical cases of completed R&D-projects, Britain and the United 
States, 1700-2000, Empire State Index; semi-logarithmic scale. 
 
Notes: ‘Britain’ refers to the British cases from table 4; the other labels refer to the respective categories of the U.S. cases in table 
5. The Empire State Index divides the real GDP-deflated R&D-costs by the construction costs of the Empire State Building (1931). 
Sources: tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
0.000001
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
1700 1725 1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
P
ro
je
ct
 c
os
ts
 a
s 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
D
P
Chemicals
Cracking
Aircraft
Other
Britain
 
Figure 2. Real costs of selected historical cases of completed R&D-projects, Britain and the United 
States, 1700-2000, GDP-share; semi-logarithmic scale. 
 
Notes: see figure 1. 
Sources: tables 4 and 5. 
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Figure 3. Real costs of selected historical cases of completed R&D-projects and their time lags, Britain 
and the United States, 1700-2000, Empire State Index and years; semi-logarithmic scale. 
 
Notes: see figure 1. 
Sources: tables 4 and 5. 
 
development of the DC-8. One thus could say that the ship’s clock was the eighteenth 
century’s Manhattan project. The water frame came close to this scale as well. The 
spinning jenny, with far more modest development costs, was comparable to the 
development of the hoisting machine in 1880, the Linde liquefied air process of 1895, 
the tube tank catalytic cracking process of 1918, the DC-1/DC-2 of 1932 or the 
development and testing of recombinant growth hormone in 1982. The Babbage 
difference engine and the self-acting mule of the 1820s were comparable, as share of 
GDP, to DuPont’s purchase of the Claude process in 1924, the development of titanium 
in 1946, that of Dacron in 1948, and Apple Computer’s pre-IPO costs in the late 1970s. 
It is also clear from figure 1 that until at least the 1950s, British firms were able to carry 
out large scale research projects that were broadly similar in size to many large U.S. 
R&D projects. 
 Looking at the time lags (figure 3) it is clear that few positive time lags were 
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larger then ten years, and few negative time lags (for prizes or patent purchases or 
R&D in process purchases) shorter than minus ten years. Of the positive time lag 
projects, very few projects had a long time lag and low costs. Of the negative time lag 
projects, very few had a long negative time lag, and very few had very high costs. Most 
cases were within two adjacent areas: between zero and five years in the range of 
1/1000 to 1 ESI, or between five and ten years, in the range of 1/100 to 1 ESI. It is also 
clear that the most costly projects did not have the longest duration. Babbage’s 
difference engine seems to be an outlier with twenty years of development. It is also 
clear that the Manhattan project and the Apollo project were the biggest cases of their 
time. In figure 3, obviously lower and higher bounds can be drawn in which we find 
most of the cases. 
 
3.3 The sensitivity of R&D outlays to cash flow 
It is clear from the above that firms needed cash to carry out R&D: with very limited 
possibilities for collateral, real uncertainty, long multi-stage time lags, and information 
asymmetries, the market for the financing of R&D-projects was highly imperfect. This is 
not unrelated to the pecking order theory of corporate finance introduced by Myers and 
Majluf (1984), who argue that because of adverse selection, financers will demand 
higher returns on certain kinds of projects. External finance will thus be more expensive 
on these projects and a pecking order will emerge that effectively ranks financing 
alternatives in an order descending in the degree to which they enable managers to 
exploit investment opportunities: internal funds, then high-priority debt, lower priority 
debt, and finally equity (see also Triantis 2000). R&D appears to be an extreme case 
because of the severe information asymmetries, the absence of collateral, the time lag 
and uncertainty. 
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This perspective is corroborated by present-day empirical evidence on the 
sensitivity of R&D-outlays to firms’ cash flow. If cash and financing constraints are 
important we would expect that R&D outlays are very sensitive to cash flow. If this were 
not the case, we could reject our hypothesis. 
Although studies vary, they generally find that R&D-outlays far more sensitive to 
changes in cash flow for smaller enterprises than for large enterprises (table 6) 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto, 2008).14 Estimates for the cash-flow 
elasticity of R&D vary from 0.4 to 0.8 between several studies, suggesting that a one 
percent increase in free cash flow would lead roughly speaking to a 0.6 percent 
increase in R&D (Bloch, 2005; Hall, 2002).  
Table 6. Estimates of R&D elasticity and investment elasticity to cash flow from selected studies, 1974-2006.
Country Period Industry Measured parameter Elasticity Source
US 1980-2001 pharmaceuticals drug-price elasticity of R&D 0.6 Giacotto, Santerre and Vernon JLE 2005
Italy 1998-2003 Small Italian mfg. firms cash flow elasticity of R&D strongly positive Ughetto 2008 CJE
US 1983-1987 179 firms in high-tech industries cash flow elasticity of R&D 0.67 Himmelberg and Petersen 1994 RES
US 1983-1987 179 firms in high-tech industries (c    cash flow elasticity phys. I. 0.82 Himmelberg and Petersen 1994 RES
US 1974-1994 pharmaceuticals cash flow elasticity of R&D 0.22 Vernon 2004 JPFEP
US 1974-1994 11 major drug firms cash flow elasticity of R&D strongly positive Grabowski and Vernon 2000 JEE
US 1970-2006 high tech firms cash flow elasticity of R&D "comparatively strong" Brown and Petersen JBF 2009
US 1970-2006 high tech firms cash flow elasticity phys. I. "largely disappears" Brown and Petersen JBF 2009
US 1990-2004 young high-tech firms cash flow elasticity of R&D "significant effects" Brown, Fazzari and Petersen 2009 JF
US 1990-2004 mature high-tech firms cash flow elasticity of R&D insignificant Brown, Fazzari and Petersen 2009 JF
Note : Phys. I. = physical investment.
Sources : see last column and bibliography.  
Brown and Petersen (2009) show that since 1970 the cash-flow elasticity of physical 
investment has declined sharply, perhaps because of better functioning capital 
markets, while the cash-flow elasticity of R&D outlays has remained. Vernon (2004) 
finds that after controlling for endogeneity large pharmaceutical firms’ R&D was still 
sensitive to cash flow, but that the sensitivity, 0.22,  was lower than values from other 
studies (see also Gabrowski and Vernon (2000); Schroth and Szalay (2010)). Brown, 
Fazzari and Petersen (2009) even find that the 1990s R&D boom, mainly in internet-
related technologies, can be largely explained by finance supply shifts that increased 
the cash available to young firms. 
 Despite the varying findings and the measurement difficulties all this evidence 
                                            
14 Mulkay et al. (2001), using cash flow net of R&D outlays but gross of ordinary investment for large U.S. and French manufacturing firms between 
1979 and 1993, find little difference between the sensitivity of their R&D and their ordinary investments to cash flow net of R&D outlays. 
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points to the notion that firms needed cash, not capital to finance R&D-projects. 
Despite the five obstacles to obtaining research finance, they were generally able to 
finance projects. In the next section we are going to review some organisational forms 
and institutional instruments that firms used to finance R&D. 
 
 
4. The institutional evolution of the allocation of cash for R&D  
From the historical evidence above it is clear that aggregate R&D-outlays grew faster 
than GDP-growth for a long time, and that particular R&D-projects involving large scale 
outlays have existed at least since the mid-eighteenth century. Despite the financing 
obstacles, from early on firms were able to incur large amounts of R&D outlays for large 
and uncertain projects, resulting in a phenomenal growth of aggregate cash outlays on 
R&D. 
 This finding is not unrelated to other work on organisations and institutions. 
Ostrom (1990), for example, finds that although classical economic theory predicts that 
common pool resources such as fishing grounds, commons or water supply will be 
depleted without government intervention, communities developed many different ways 
to govern the common pool resources. In practice few were depleted.15 Likewise, 
Chandler’s historical masterwork (1962) showed convincingly that organisations did 
matter in economic processes. In Williamson’s (1981) words ‘after Chandler, nobody 
could argue anymore that organisations did not matter’. Williamson (1985) shows how 
firms are able to solve transaction problems that would be problematic if carried out 
through a market. 
 Likewise, we note that in practice firms have been resourceful and creative in 
                                            
15 In many respects R&D is the obverse of common pool resources (CPR): applied R&D is partially excludable and non-diminishable (nonrivalrous) 
while CPR are non-excludable and non-diminishable. CPR also involve hardly any sunk costs, uncertainty, time lags, adverse selection and moral 
hazard. CPR already exist while R&D-projects need to be realised. Solutions to CPR-problems focus on preventing over-use, while solutions to R&D-
problems tend to prevent underinvestment. The financing of CPR-exploitation is relatively easy, that of R&D relatively hard.  
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finding solutions to the R&D-financing problem. We will argue that over time a series of 
cash allocation devices emerged that allowed firms to accumulate cash and sink it into 
R&D-projects. In figure 4 the most important of these are shown in the period when 
they rose to dominance. These solutions enabled arbitrage to take place in cash for 
R&D projects, through individuals, such as angel investors, through organisations, such 
as multinationals, and through institutions, such as venture capital. 
 The cash allocation devices we discuss below can be divided into several 
different, overlapping ways. They can be divided into devices depending on internal 
and those depending on external financing. They can be divided according to whether 
they can provide small-scale or large-scale financing. They can be divided according 
the stage in the R&D process they most easily finance: early stage or later stage R&D 
(Branscomb and Auerswald 2001, 2002). They can also be divided into whether they 
use free cash flow or not. And they can be divided into private, semi-public, public and 
legal-institutional devices. Given that the latter division most closely relates to our 
research question, we will use it to guide our discussion, keeping the other comparative 
dimensions in mind, and revisiting them in the comparative discussion at the end.  
 We will discuss subsequently, in chronological order, the following private 
institutions: individual self-financing, angel investors, free cash flow from existing 
operations, the stock market, mergers and acquisitions, multinationals, venture capital, 
and R&D financing organisations; the following semi-public institutions: universities, 
independent labs and industry association labs; the following public institutions: 
government R&D, monopoly grants and government R&D-contracts; and, finally, the 
following legal-institutional instruments: property right, prizes, intellectual property 
rights, and knowledge sharing. This series is not exhaustive: we have restricted 
ourselves to the major institutional solutions. Although they emerged gradually over  
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Figure 4. Historical emergence of institutional solutions to the R&D-financing problem. 
 Before 
1750 
1750-1850 1850-1900 1900-1930 1930-1950 1950-1980 1980-2010 
Private  
Individual self-financing 
   
Angel investors 
 
  
Cash-flow from existing operations 
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Venture capital 
 
Semi-
public 
   
Universities 
 
 
 
   
Independent research laboratories 
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Use of government R&D 
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Government R&D contracts 
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Note: this is an informal and broad periodisation. The period refers to the period when the solution became widely adopted for the financing of R&D, 
 not to the period when the underlying organisational form or institutional instrument first appeared.. 
Source: see text. 
 
 
time, the R&D-financing solutions were not mutually exclusive. In the late twentieth 
century an R&D project, for example, could use different devices to get cash for 
different stages of R&D. It could start, for example, as a project in a university, followed 
by self-financing by individuals, followed by an angel investment, then venture capital, 
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an IPO and a merger. As normal as the staged use of these devises may seem today, 
with some R&D projects going through several of them, they emerged historically, and 
to some extent in the order that they are used today. By briefly discussing these 
devices in succession, we aim to show how each addressed some aspect of the R&D 
financing problem, resulting in broad spectrum of financing options available today.  
Many organisational solutions had several different purposes and solved various 
different challenges simultaneously.  We are not arguing that each of these devices 
had as main purpose the financing of R&Dsome clearly had other important 
purposes, but we do argue that many devices could be and were used for mitigating 
the R&D-financing problem. 
 
4.1 Private institutions 
The purest, simplest and probably oldest solution to the R&D-financing problem is 
obviously self-financing by individuals. Experimenting at one’s own cost might even 
take place within animal species. It solves the sunk costs and information asymmetry 
obstacles, and given that there is no pressing need for profits, the cost of uncertainty 
and long time-lags are probably felt less. The latter, of course, also might reduce the 
incentive to push for commercial innovation. Many examples exist of gentleman-
scientists who made massive contributions to science rather than focus on commercial 
application. 
Charles Darwin and Henry Cavendish are well-known examples. A post-war 
British exponent is Peter Mitchell who built his own research lab at his country mansion 
and developed the chemiosmotic hypothesis, for which he won the Nobel Prize 
(Kealey, 1996: 75). Striking cases are also Edmund Cartwright who funded the 
development of the power loom from his own fortune, J. B. Lawes who together with G. 
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H. Gilbert invented superphosphate at his Rothamsted farm lab in the 1820s, and 
Eugène Houdry who used his family fortune to develop the Houdry catalytic cracking 
process during the 1920s (Allen, 2009; Kealey, 1996; Freeman and Soete, 1997). The 
latter case also shows how self-financing is limited by the size of one’s fortune, as 
Houdry eventually had to form a joint-venture with two oil firms to pay for development 
costs.  
Another cash allocation device was the use of the angel investor, an investor 
who provided cash at a very early stage under flexible conditions. The angel investor 
allowed the innovator to incur sunk costs by providing cash. The time-lag became also 
less pressing because, contrary to bank loans, no regular interest payments were 
required. Uncertainty remained. The angel investor did bear all three problems of sunk 
costs, uncertainty and long time lags, but by definition they were independently wealthy 
and could miss the cash. Adverse selection and moral hazard remained, but generally 
angel investors mitigated this in three ways. Sometimes they financed family projects, 
where family ties decreased the angel’s monitoring costs and increased the innovator’s 
cost of opportunism. Sometimes they had made their fortune in related industries so 
were knowledgeable about the innovator’s field. Often they operated in informal 
networks exchanging information and monitoring jointly with other angels. Examples of 
the latter were probably the Lunar Society during the Industrial Revolution, of which 
many leading industrialists were member. A late nineteenth century French example 
was a group of families around Lyon that had made their fortune in silk and textiles and 
which supported firms in new industries. By providing easy cash they bankrolled 
Charles Pathé’s audacious entry into the phonograph and motion picture business, his 
company becoming the largest film producer-distributor in the world before 1914. 
 Sometimes entrepreneurs that made their fortune in one new industry were 
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happy to put cash in other new and uncertain projects, with the full knowledge they 
might not get it back. At other times entrepreneurs had a more direct interest in the 
project they backed, and were also likely to contribute knowledge and contacts. James 
Watt, for example, was initially backed by the owner of a drowned mine that could not 
be saved with existing pumps. Likewise, Hargreaves’ development of the spinning 
jenny was bankrolled by a textile industrialist, who paid him a wage, board and lodging 
and all the costs of the prototype and assistants. This must have been a significant 
amount, and at that time it was not at all clear that the venture would pay off. 
Hargreaves’ presence on his backer’s estate helped mitigate moral hazard by allowing 
continuous monitoring. A famous American angel investor was the author Mark Twain, 
of St Louis, who was fascinated by technology and a close friend of Nikola Tesla. 
Twain almost bankrupted himself by putting a sum of $190,000 (about $4m in 2005 
dollars, or $173m in GDP-share) in a failed type-setting machine. He also funded 
various other projects, such as the creation of one-handed grape-shears, perpetual 
calendars and a cloth made from peat (Lewis, 2011). 
Taking cash flow out of existing operations is a tried and tested method to 
finance R&D. It differs from self-financing by individuals in that existing operations 
deliver a cash flow that can be sunk in R&D within the same business. The German 
chemical firms of the later nineteenth century, for example, started to sink cash flow 
from their dyestuff business into pharmaceutical laboratories which eventually grew into 
large and profitable pharmaceutical divisions (Beer, 1958; Liebenau, 1988). Likewise, 
ICI, the British chemical conglomerate, started sinking some cash flow into a 
pharmaceutical division from the mid-1930s. Only after twenty years did it start to make 
some profit, and only after thirty years did it become very profitable, with the 
introduction of several new types of drugs such as corticosteroids and beta blockers 
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(Owen, 1999). Nowadays high technology firms such as Apple, Cisco, Google, 
Facebook and Amazon hold large cash piles in part to finance R&D and the acquisition 
of patent portfolios and R&D-firms (see introduction, above). 
With cash flow financing the monies are generally written off immediately, so that 
the financing problems associated with sunk costs, uncertainty and the time lag are 
mitigated, as no costs are carried in the accounts that need to be written off if a project 
fails. The funding method assumes, of course, a cash flow that is large and long-lasting 
enough to sustain R&D projects. Studies showing the present-day sensitivity of R&D 
outlays to cash flows have been discussed above. 
 The adoption of modern incorporation laws during the nineteenth century 
(Harris, 2000) constituted a step change in the cash allocation possibilities for R&D. 
The corporation mitigated sunk costs because they were shared by many investors, 
because dispersed shareholders could diversify, because shares were transferable so 
shareholders were not tied to the R&D-project for its duration, and, finally, because 
limited liability shareholders were less concerned about uncertain high-sunk cost 
projects with a small but not insignificant likelihood to bankrupt the firm. 
 The corporation mitigated the problems caused by time lags, first, by offering 
transferable shares, second, by keeping cash locked-in because it did not face the 
potential call on its assets that partnerships faced upon exit of a partner, and, third, by 
the fact that corporations could survive beyond the life of its managers, owners and 
employees. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard were alleviated by doing research in-house 
and setting up in-house R&D-labs. Schumpeter (1942: 96) noted that “the first thing a 
modern concern does as soon as it feels that it can afford it is to establish a research 
department.” The latter was not only important for generating inventions, but also for 
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being able to find, screen and buy outside inventions, to be able to prepare the 
acquisition of other companies, and to generally assist in anticipating future industry 
development (Simon, 1993; Nicholas, 2010).  
Finally, corporations’ delegated control allowed for the governance of free cash 
flow, so that it stayed inside the corporation and could be used for things such as R&D, 
rather than be claimed by shareholders. Kamien and Schwartz (1982: 28) suggest that 
if stockholders accept normal stock returns on the presumption that management has 
superior knowledge, extraordinary profits will allow firms to finance R&D in an 
uninhibited, flexible manner. Some studies, however, find shareholders myopic, 
showing how share prices generally fall when R&D-outlays rise, even if in the past such 
increases led to high returns. Goodacre and Tonks (1995: 317-318), for example, find a 
negative effect of R&D-outlays on share prices, using a complete data-set based on 
forced disclosure and thus preventing sample selection bias for the public 
announcement of ‘good’ R&D-projects. They also note the myopic incentive of 
managers to cut R&D-expenditure, as it will immediately increase profits. Likewise, 
Munari, Oriani and Sobrero (2010) find a greater pressure towards the reduction of 
R&D in market-based governance systems such as in Britain and the United States 
(see also O’Sullivan, 2000; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). Other studies, however, do 
not find a negative effect of corporate governance on R&D spending, making the 
evidence mixed. Meulbroek et al. (1990), for example, find that U.S.’ firms R&D/sales 
ratios decline after implementing takeover defences, and Hall and Hall (1993) do not 
find evidence of shareholders myopia towards R&D (see also Hall 1994). The various 
studies might highlight different sides of the same coin, especially since corporate 
governance is hard to measure unambiguously. Triantis (2000), for example, argues 
that, partially because of the pecking order of financing alternatives, too little financial 
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slack prevents the firm from exploiting profitable investment opportunities, while too 
much slack encourages managerial misbehaviour and exacerbates agency problems. 
Christensen (2008) explains how over-use of financial tools leads to underspending on 
R&D, for example by erroneously comparing projects against a status quo that will 
persist in the absence of R&D. 
The nineteenth German chemical firms did not actually make a return on 
investment calculation when founding research labs (Liebenau, 1988: 118). Carl Bosch, 
the CEO of IG Farben explained that “[R&D] is not there to give big profits to our 
shareholders. Our guide and our duty is to work for those who come after us to 
establish the processes on which they will work” (Hayes 1987; von Tunzelmann, 1995). 
Usually big projects required ten years of research, yielded ten years of substantial 
returns and another ten years of sagging returns, according to Bosch. ICI held similar 
views on its fledgling pharmaceutical business. 
Business history encompasses many cases in which shareholder activism leads 
to curtailment of R&D spending. Curtiss-Wright, for example, a leading American 
aircraft firm in the 1930s, planned a post-war R&D budget of $36m ($290m in 2005 
dollars and $2.0bn as GDP-share). After a campaign of key shareholders the R&D 
budget was slashed and partially paid out as dividend. Subsequently the CW-20 plane 
failed and Curtiss-Wright had to leave airframe manufacturing to become a major 
component maker (Sutton 1998: 431). The case appears to corroborate Christensen’s 
(2008) critique on the overuse of financial tools for R&D-planning. 
Another way to obtain cash was an initial public offering (IPO) on a stock market. 
The modern stock market developed during the nineteenth century in tandem with the 
new incorporation laws. In Victorian Britain and in the United States listing 
requirements were lax and early-stage firms were floated in industries such as cars, 
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cinema, music, planes and electricity.  Although many focused on the application of 
proven innovations, such as the railway companies, bicycle manufacturers and cinema 
operators, a few concerned research into unproven technologies (Michie, 1981; 1988). 
As regulation became stronger it became more difficult for new industries to get 
cash through IPOs. After 1945 the modern venture capital industry emerged, which 
grew faster when, in 1971, the NASDAQ opened. This exchange had lower listing 
requirements, which were even further relaxed in the 1980s. A symbiosis emerged in 
which the flotation option stimulated venture capital because profitable exit was now 
possible without positive cash flow. An IPO also released continuous information about 
how others valuated the venture. If anybody knew more about its true value it should 
show in price movements and short selling.  
Although it has been almost impossible to get cash through an IPO exclusively 
for early-stage R&D, from the perspective of the firm, a stock market flotation solved 
the issue of sunk costs, as no regular interest payments were needed. It probably also 
mitigated the pressure of the time lag, especially if governance was rather imperfect. 
For investors, the stock market partially mitigated the sunk costs problem and the time 
lag, since shares were now readily tradable and an investor could exit any time. It also 
reduced uncertainty because in theory the stock price contained perfect information, 
containing all relevant persons’ views on the expected pay-off of the firms sunk R&D-
outlays. 
Another way to obtain cash for R&D was through mergers and acquisitions, 
referred to simply as ‘mergers’ hereafter. We restrict ourselves here to mergers by 
large firms. We will ignore the buying of small technology firms by big firms; our main 
focus is on the merger as a device for increasing cash flow.  Mergers mitigated the 
sunk costs problem when the merged firm had larger absolute cash flows, allowing 
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more, larger scale and longer-term R&D-projects, even if the R&D/sales ratio actually 
fell. On the supply side mergers allowed more R&D to be done as there was a larger 
market share with a larger cash flow, while at the same time on the demand side a 
larger market share meant that R&D once it was finished, could be rolled out more 
quickly and enjoy shorter pay-back periods. 
The trusts in the late nineteenth century United States did not get many cash 
flow advantages, because member companies remained separate entities. In the wake 
of the antitrust acts, when firms needed to merge if they wanted to set prices legally, 
the cash flow to merged firms increased and a sharp rise in R&D-outlays was initiated 
(Nicholas 2003). A clear historical example of M&As leading to more cash flow and 
then to more R&D is the chemical industry in the first half of the twentieth century. 
DuPont in the United States and IG Farben in Germany became gigantic firms with 
enormous R&D budgets and long time horizons. Escalating R&D costs persuaded the 
individual firms to form IG Farben in 1925 (Freeman, 1963). In 1928, Standard Oil of 
New Jersey paid an unprecedented $35m ($330m in 2005 dollars, and $4.3bn as 2005 
GDP-share) for the rights to IG Farben’s patent portfolio outside of Germany (table 5). 
In Britain, ICI, within four years after its 1926 merger quadrupled its R&D budget to 
£1m, about a quarter of all R&D done in Britain and three quarters of that in the 
chemical industry, rising to £1.4m in 1939, about 17 percent of all British R&D (Hannah, 
1983: 113). As noted above, ICI had a very long-term horizon and was willing, for 
example, to sink cash in pharmaceuticals for over twenty years without seeing any 
profit. 
Having many divisions, these firms could take a longer term perspective, as they 
could sustain negative cash flow in one division for some time, allowing longer payback 
periods. Absent a market for R&D-cash, capital markets could only do this very 
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imperfectly on their own, and firms with multiple business units were needed.  
Cassiman (2005), for example, finds a strong increase in R&D if merging firms have 
complementary technologies. 
Another example of an industry in which mergers were important for R&D-
financing was civil aviation, which, starting from relatively modest development costs in 
the 1920s, became one of the most R&D-intensive industries. Aircraft manufacturer 
Douglas, for example, struggled under the burden of escalating R&D-spending (table 5) 
and the rapid expansion of production of its best-selling but underpriced DC-9 plane. 
John Sutton (1998: 447-8) argues that when Douglas reported profits of only $4m in the 
first quarter of 1966, the stock market began to look askance at the company’s recent 
accounting change under which it stopped writing off R&D-outlays as they occurred, 
but entered them in the accounts as an asset under deferred charges, thus enhancing 
apparent profitability. The company’s stock price collapsed by 75 percent, and the 
company needed a cash injection of $400m. It was only saved by a merger with 
McDonnell. Thirty years later R&D-costs had become so high that even the merged 
company could not afford them anymore and merged in its turn with Boeing. 
 Mergers mitigated technical uncertainty by joining the R&D of two firms and 
strategic uncertainty by taking out another innovator that could launch competing 
products. Market uncertainty was alleviated by having a larger market share, making 
the launching of new products easier, and profit uncertainty was reduced by having a 
larger cash flow from the enlarged market share to pay for fixed costs. This probably 
also reduced the time lag between the start of sales and actual profits.  
 Adverse selection and moral hazard were mitigated by not using external 
finance to fund R&D, but by bringing another, external source of cash flow inside the 
firm through merger. The acquirer could mitigate adverse selection by approaching 
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targets itself, rather than by responding to overtures by firms wanting to be bought. 
Acquisitions were also a way to buy a bundle of R&D projects that there difficult to 
separate from each other and from the firm-specific knowledge of the target firm. 
Sometimes the target firm could be capitalised on the acquirer’s balance sheet 
and written off in several years, meaning that the target’s R&D became capitalised (Lev 
1999). Whether the acquired R&D was immediately written off or capitalised, an 
approximate momentary valuation of it had taken place because of the market 
transaction, much like a solar eclipse revealing information about the sun. While in the 
United States since 1974 expenditure on R&D has to be written off immediately, 
several other countries allow firms to capitalise acquired and/or their own R&D (Lev 
and Sougiannis 1996). Only in some industries, however, was R&D a large part of the 
acquired firm.  
 R&D by a multinational enterprise is of course a special form of using cash flow 
from existing operations to finance R&D. It merits separate treatment as the 
multinational provided a mechanism that helped this cash to cross borders. The 
hypothesis that multinationals exist to arbitrate in capital has been questioned at least 
since the 1960s (Jones, 2000). However, in the case of R&D, instead of arbitrating in 
capital, multinationals arbitrated in R&D-cash, for which no market existed and which 
had no law of one price, and therefore could only cross borders through a particular 
institution, such as the multinational firm. 
Modern multinational enterprises emerged during the late nineteenth century 
and became prominent during the first half of the twentieth century. They undoubtedly 
expanded abroad for many other reasons than R&D (Jones, 2000). Yet, as Buckley 
and Casson (1991) argue, after 1945 firm-specific knowledge became a key driver of 
the expansion of the multinational enterprise, which became “an international 
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intelligence system for the acquisition and collection of basic knowledge relevant to 
R&D”. 
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, for example, electronic and pharmaceutical 
multinationals’ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) existed for eighty percent of greenfield 
investments, in the majority of cases exploiting their firm-specific knowledge 
(Kuemmerle, 1999). More recently, Unn (2008) found that subsidiaries of multinationals 
used less external R&D than domestic firms, because they could use their parent’s 
R&D, and Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) found that local firms in transition 
economies such as those in Eastern Europe were less innovative and productive than 
foreign-owned firms, and attributed this to their difficulty in attracting capital and 
presumably also cash for innovation (see also Nicholas 2011).  
 The multinational had particular knowledge combined with a pile of cash, and 
this allowed it to sink outlays that domestic firms could not sink because they lacked 
either the knowledge or the cash. The multinationals’ foreign cash flow mitigated the 
sunk costs problem, its knowledge technical uncertainty, its international distribution 
network market and profit uncertainty. If it bought stakes in existing firms, its technical 
knowledge helped to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, while its 
international market knowledge helped it to better valuate the target than domestic 
firms.16 
A major form for the financing of early-stage R&D is venture capital. A large 
literature exists on venture capital and here we will only discuss it briefly in terms of our 
obstacles and in a historical perspective. Early forms of financing resembling venture 
capital existed already in Britain during the Industrial Revolution, the venture capitalists 
being called ‘projectors’ (Brunt, 2006; Allen, 2009).  A century later, in Victorian Britain, 
many venture capital-like investments were placed in firms in new industries that were 
                                            
16 For a detailed historical case study on the role of knowledge and sunk costs in the evolution of multinationals see Bakker (2006). 
Gerben Bakker, How firms have financed R&D since the Industrial Revolution, LSE Working Paper, 1-05-2013, p. 46 of 63 
 46 
subsequently floated on the stock exchange (Michie 1981; 1988). Modern venture 
capital emerged in the 1940s in the United States, and its history has been well-
documented elsewhere (Lerner, 2009). Its evolution was dependent on large-scale 
government cash outlays on defence and health R&D. American Research and 
Development Corporation, set up and run by Georges F. Doriot in 1946, is widely 
considered to be one of the first venture capital firms. It made a huge profit from an 
investment in Digital Equipment Corporation. ARD was followed by many other firms, 
and several regulatory changes helped spur a boom in venture capital. From 1971 
technology companies could be floated on the NASDAQ stock exchange, reducing the 
time lag in which investments were locked-in, and in 1981 NASDAQ listing 
requirements were further relaxed. In the late 1970s jurisprudence allowed pension 
funds and endowments to invest in venture capital. Relaxed Californian labour law 
allowed employees to rapidly switch between different firms in the same industry: they 
could leave a firm and work at a related firm the next week. Unlike their East Coast 
counterparts, Californian employers were unable to prevent this because of the 
unenforceability of post-employment covenants not to compete (Saxenian 1994; 
Gilson, 1999; Bankman and Gilson, 1999). Since the 1970s, large corporations also 
spun off research into separate ventures. General Electric was one of the first firms to 
have a dedicated programme for this. In the 1980s the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) and the 
Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986) were introduced that facilitated the commercial 
exploitation of inventions from universities and government labs (Mowery, 2009).  
 Already in the 1920s Knight (1921:333) mentioned the possibility of an 
entrepreneur specialising in setting up many new ventures and others investing in her; 
the investors can assess her track record in organising new ventures. Knight called this 
‘capitalisation of the entrepreneurial function’ and also discussed how, with more 
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ventures in one enterprise, errors could cancel each other out.  
From the innovator’s perspective, venture capital mitigated the sunk costs and 
time lag problems by providing long-term cash in steps upon the achievement of 
technical milestones. From the capitalist’s perspective, the sunk cost problem was 
largely solved through five different factors. Initial discovery costs were often borne by 
universities or government labs, with the venture capitalists only picking the survivors. 
Staged financing limited the cash sunk until the next decision point. Unlike corporate 
R&D-labs individual ventures were clearly separated and could be closed down quickly 
and smoothly. Finally, often a life insurance policy was taken out on key scientists. 
The investor’s uncertainty problem was partially solved by technical milestones, 
enabling the frequent reassessment of a project’s prospects, and by betting on 
industries through portfolio investing, rather than on individual ventures. Patents 
protected against imitation and enabled funding, because they allowed the revelation of 
technical details. The time lag problem was mitigated by the possibility to float ventures 
early on the stock market, or to sell it to large corporations. Adverse selection was 
alleviated by having scientists on the financer’s board, by knowledge gained through 
funding multiple projects in one technical area and by investing in consortia with other 
venture capital firms with knowledgeable managers. Picking only the successful 
projects from universities and government labs that generated large amounts of 
inventions without a profit motive, also reduced adverse selection. Moral hazard was 
reduced by giving key scientists equity stakes and stock options, having seats on the 
board of start-ups and by regular site visits. In this way, venture capital firms could 
provide an incentive system for key scientists, that large corporations found difficult to 
provide (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998). 
 A financing method related to venture capital was that of the external research 
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and development financing organisation (RDFO). Firms with a low marginal tax rate 
that lacked a sufficient cash flow or a cash pile to finance R&D from, put a specific, 
separable part of their research in a RDFO, in which outside investors with high 
marginal tax rates then invested, with the research in progress and patents as collateral 
(Beatty et al. 1995). The immediate tax deductibility of R&D was thus sold to investors, 
who valued it more, though Beatty et al. (1995) caution that taxes were likely not the 
only reason for the use of RDFOs. RDFO-type organisations were established after 
1974 and RDFOs became widely used between 1980 and 1986, when over 150 were 
formed, raising over $1 billion per year at their peak (Beatty et al. 1995). They were 
often used by cash-constrained venture capital backed technology firms. Beatty et al. 
find that transaction costs and investor’s concerns about adverse selection and moral 
hazard made the cost for the R&D-firm about two to three times that of a ‘seasoned 
equity offering’, and therefore RDFOs were mainly used by firms that were seriously 
cash-constrained. In 1982, Genentech, for example, raised $50 million by putting the 
further development and testing of manufacturing processes and alternative delivery 
systems for human growth hormone and gamma interferon in a separate entity 
underwritten by outside investors (Beatty et al. 1995: 416).  
 
4.2 Semi-public and public institutions 
The private institutions discussed above were embedded in other layers of semi-public 
and public institutions, as well as in legal-institutional instruments.17 The major semi-
public institution that helped firms finance R&D was the university. In mid-nineteenth 
century Britain, several industrialists helped fund universities that included technical 
subjects, and many older universities also embraced those subjects more fully 
(Sanderson, 1972). Likewise, from the mid-nineteenth century most German chemical 
                                            
17 On the multiple layers of institutional arrangements in which particular cases are embedded, see, for example, Ostrom (1990). 
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firms used nearby university professors under consulting contracts. Many new products 
emerged from these, and their students staffed the growing corporate R&D-labs. 
Similarly, in the United States in the interwar period, new pharmaceutical firms would 
locate close to universities (MacGarvie and Furrman, 2007).  
Universities mitigated the sunk costs problem by bearing the costs of the 
‘misses’, leaving the hits for firms to exploit. By bearing the fixed costs of a large 
existing research infrastructure they reduced the size of the fixed costs firms needed to 
incur. Uncertainty for firms was mitigated if university staff had already screened out 
unpromising leads, and when firms consulted university staff, they were assured by the 
hiring and publishing criteria in academia that they passed a minimum quality 
threshold. The university also shortened time lags, by performing the earliest-stage 
R&D, so that the clock only started ticking when a firm licensed it and began to sink 
cash. As noted in the discussion of venture capital above, adverse selection in the 
licensing of university innovations was probably low as they were non-profit institutions, 
and often firms approached universities rather than vice-versa. In the late twentieth 
century universities sometimes may have become more proactive in pursuing revenues 
from scientific advances that emerged in the university, but the university organisations 
as a whole remained generally not-for-profit organisations heavily dependent on 
donations and endowments, and the set of scientific projects from which promising 
technologies were selected for commercial licensing was probably not strongly affected 
by commercial motivations (Mansfield, 1991, 1998). 
 Another semi-public institution was the industry association lab, where sunk 
costs were shared across an industry, so reducing strategic uncertainty. They became 
prevalent in interwar Britain (Sanderson, 1972; Edgerton and Horrocks, 1994). Private 
independent research labs fulfilled a slightly similar function and had been in existence 
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since at least the late nineteenth century. A prime example was the Edison Lab, which 
besides working on its own inventions, also had many contracts with outside firms 
(Dodgson and Gann, 2010: 92). 
Besides private and semi-public ways to raise cash for R&D, public institutions 
were also important. The major ones were government laboratories, government R&D-
contracts awarded to private firms, and state monopolies. Direct research by 
government laboratories helped firms to finance R&D in a way broadly similar to 
exploiting university research. Agricultural, defence and health R&D-labs have all been 
important. The U.S. National Institutes of Health, for example, have generated many 
inventions that were developed further by companies, such as the first HIV-medicine. 
Another public institution was the government funding of R&D carried out by 
firms. Before the Second World War direct funding of R&D-projects by governments 
was less common. In the U.S. aircraft industry, for example, the Department of Defence 
would ask manufacturers to show off their prototypes on an airstrip at a certain date, 
and then chose one model to be manufactured (O’Sullivan, 2007). In interwar Britain, 
the government subsidised laboratories set up by industry associations, and financed 
several research-intensive programmes, such as the airship programme between 1924 
and 1930 (Edgerton and Horrocks, 1994: 225).  
After 1945, governments increasingly started to fund R&D directly through 
contracting. Alic (2013) provides a detailed historical study of U.S. defence contracting 
after 1945, showing how R&D became one of the largest components. Government 
R&D-contracts mitigated sunk costs, especially with cost-plus contracts, as the 
government paid for them, they lowered strategic uncertainty as it was usually known if 
the government contracted with other firms as well, and it reduced market uncertainty, 
as the single buyer had signalled it was interested in the innovation. The time-lag was 
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also less pressing as there was already a positive cash flow in the R&D-phase through 
government payments. However, the firm did need to overcome adverse selection 
problems and had to find a way to signal to the government that it was a reliable 
contractor to carry out the R&D. A potential solution was for the government to 
approach the firm rather than vice versa. The firm might also submit to regular 
monitoring to overcome moral hazard. 
Another public institution was the awarding of a monopoly by the stateoften, 
but not always to a firm that was state-owned. An early example was the awarding of a 
monopoly to postal and telegraph services in Britain in the late nineteenth century. A 
prime modern example was the telecom industry in Europe and North America during 
most of the twentieth century. Many firms maintained large central laboratories, the 
most famous of which was Bell Labs, which spawned several Nobel Laureates. The 
labs often lacked a clear profit-motive and legitimacy to maximise revenue. Under 
pressure from anti-trust suits, Bell Labs, for example, licensed its technology for a 
minimal fee. 
Monopolies alleviated the sunk cost problem, as the monopolist could set prices 
to ensure a certain amount of cash flow. It also reduced strategic, market and profit 
uncertainty by the absence of competitors. Time lags became also less pressing, for 
better or for worse, by the absence of competitors and the steady, guaranteed cash 
flow that could pay for R&D. Given the monopoly, external financers might even 
willingly finance the R&D.  
 
4.3 Legal-institutional instruments 
Other devices that helped firms finance R&D were legal-institutional solutions such as 
property rights per se, prizes, patents and knowledge sharing. The awarding of 
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innovation prizes had been a tried and tested method. An iconic prize was the English 
Board of Longitude Prize (1716). For the innovator, a prize did not mitigate the sunk 
costs problem, but it did reduce profit uncertainty because of the guaranteed pay-off. 
However, a prize increased strategic uncertainty by encouraging more firms to enter 
the race, with a second innovator often not receiving anything. The time lag also 
became more pressing, as competitive pressure was high and prizes often carried a 
deadline.  
 From the prize-financer’s perspective, the sunk costs problem was fully solved, 
because cash only needed to be paid upon a working innovation, and in theory the 
innovation could even function as collateral for external finance: it is conceivable that a 
bank would agree to lend the funds for the prize once it had to be awarded, given that 
the underlying, now proven, innovation could be expected to yield future revenues. 
Technical, strategic and market uncertainty were largely borne by the prize contestants. 
Profit uncertainty might have been higher, as given the many entrants and their 
ownership of partial property rights it was unclear whether and how the innovator could 
profit. Usually the prize was awarded by a government or private non-profit 
organisation for an innovation of public benefit, on the condition that it was placed in 
the public domain. The inventor of celluloid, for example, did not claim a prize because 
it meant giving away the intellectual property rights. Because of the ex-post character, 
the prize also perfectly solved adverse selection and moral hazard for its financers.  
A social disadvantage was the risk of overspending on a particular R&D-
trajectory. The $10m Ansari X-Prize for the first private human space flight, for 
example, resulted in total R&D outlays by all contestants of $100m. Brunt, Lerner and 
Nicholas (2012) have identified a multitude of prizes for agricultural innovations in 
nineteenth century Britain and find that they fostered innovation. Recently firms have 
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also started to use prizes as a way to finance their R&D. A website, for example, offers 
firms to post their scientific problem and the award they will pay for the first working 
solution, with the website as guarantor to inventors.18 There are, of course, obvious 
disadvantages to this technique. 
 Another well-known legal-institutional mechanism was the patent. Patents 
mitigated the innovator’s sunk costs problem slightly, because an unsuccessful R&D-
project might still yield patents that could be sold or used to block a competitor. Patents 
reduced strategic, market and profit uncertainty by increasing imitation costs, and they 
made the time lag less pressing by delaying imitation. They also helped innovators to 
reduce the adverse selection problem as they could reveal more when they talked to 
external financers. 
 Another legal-institutional institution was knowledge sharing. Nineteenth century 
shipyards, for example, sometimes agreed to offer to each other all innovations they 
developed (MacLeod, 1999), and in the interwar period several large knowledge-
sharing arrangements were signed, such as the famous patents and processes 
agreement between ICI and DuPont (Hannah, 1983: 117). Knowledge sharing 
agreements often gave access to innovations that had yet to be made at the moment of 
signing.  
 
4.4 Comparing the institutions 
Putting all the solutions to the R&D-financing problem we discussed in one diagram 
(table 7) shows various R&D-cash allocation solutions that emerged at different points 
in history and, through survival, now all coexist together, offering the substantial menu 
of solutions that characterises today’s society. Besides the private/public classification 
which we have used as the main ordering principle of the various cash allocation 
                                            
18 http://www.kaggle.com 
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solutions, they also can be classified, of course, according to whether the finance is 
internal or external, whether projects are smaller or larger and whether they are in an 
earlier or a later stage (Table 7). 
 From the innovator’s perspective the institutions that mitigated all five obstacles 
were, in chronological order, intellectual property rights, government R&D and venture 
capital. From the financer’s perspective, institutions mitigating all obstacles were prizes 
and venture capital. Clearly venture capital is the only institution that mitigated all 
obstacles for both parties, and perhaps this explains its current popularity in financing 
particular kinds of R&D. Venture capital, was, of course, dependent on the rise of semi-
public and public R&D and intellectual property rights. 
 Institutions mitigating fewest of the obstacles were, for innovators, independent 
research labs, closely followed by self-financing and prizes. For the financers they were 
government R&D contracts (where the government is considered the financer), 
followed at some distance by angel investors, and those followed again by property 
rights per se and the stock market.19 Prizes and government R&D-contracts were the 
most asymmetric institutions. Prizes mitigated all obstacles for the prize-financer, but 
left sunk costs and the time lag unresolved for the innovator, while government R&D-
contracts mitigated all obstacles for the innovator but none for the financer (the 
government). 
The obstacles that were easiest to mitigate with some institutional solution were, 
for innovators, sunk costs and adverse selection, and, for financers, uncertainty. The 
high score of uncertainty mitigation is partially due to intellectual property rights 
safeguarding value capture, and stock markets / IPO’s delivering continuous 
information on the aggregate valuation of a project. The most difficult to mitigate 
obstacles were, for innovators, the time lag and, for financers, the time lag, adverse 
                                            
19 Alic (2013) provides an intriguing historical study of the inefficiencies in government contracting of U.S. defence R&D since 1945. 
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selection and moral hazard. The fact that the time lag is the hardest to mitigate 
obstacle for both parties, reflects the observations of Schumpeter, Keynes and Hicks 
that the time lag and the roundaboutness of the production process is one of the central 
features of capitalism, and absent from static equilibrium models. 
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Table 7. The mitigation of R&D-financing obstacles by selected institutional cash allocation mechanisms, for the innovator and the external financer. 
        Institution Since: Example Source Scale Stage Obstacles to R&D-financing mitigated  
               Inherent Transactional Total  
           Number 
 circa  I / E S / L E / L Sunk costs Uncertainty Time lag Adverse selection Moral hazard Mitigated 
            
Private            
  Self-financing < 1750 Power loom (1785) Internal Small Mixed 1  —  —  1 1 3 
  Angel investors 1750/1850 Spinning jenny (1767) External Small Earlier 1 / — — / — 1 / —  1  1  4 / 2 
  Free cash flow 1750/1850 Oil engine (1883) Internal Large All 1  — 1  1 1 4 
  Stock market/equity 1850/1900 Artificial silk (1904) External Large Later 1 / 1 — / 1 1 / 1 1  1  4 / 5 
  Mergers & Acquisitions 1850/1900 ICI / Nylon (1926/40) Ext./Int. Large All 1  1  — 1 1 4 
  Multinational enterprise 1900/1930 Viagra/sildenafil (1989) Internal Large All 1 1 — 1 1 4 
  Venture capital 1950/1980 Gene sequencing (1970s) External Small Earlier 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1  1  5 / 5 
  RDFO 1980/2000 Genentech/hormone(1982) External Mixed Later 1 / –- — / — — / — — —  1 /  
            
Semi-public            
  Universities 1850/1900 Stanford (1950s -) External Mixed Earlier 1 1 1 1 — 4 
  Independent labs 1850/1900 Edison/carbon light (1879)  Int./Ext. Mixed Earlier 1 1 —  —  —  2 
  Industry assoc. labs 1900/1930 Agricultural innovations External Mixed Earlier 1 1 — 1 1 4 
            
Public            
  Use of govt. R&D 1750/1850 Manhattan Project (1941) External Large Earlier 1  1  1  1  — 4 
  Govt. R&D contracts 1930/1950 Apollo Project (1961) External Large Earlier 1 / — 1 / — 1 / — 1 / — 1 / — 5 / 0 
  Grant of indefinite 
    legal monopoly 
1930/1950 British postal and tele- 
Communications (1869) 
Internal Large All 1 1 1 1 1 5 
            
Legal-institutional            
  Property rights per se < 1750 Largest telescope (c. 1800) Int./Ext. Mixed Mixed 1 / 1 1 / 1 — / — 1  1 4 / 3 
  Prizes < 1750 Ship’s clock (1736)  External Mixed Later — / 1 1 / 1 — / 1 1  1  3 / 5 
  Intellectual property 
    Rights 
1750/1850 IG Farben portfolio  
transfer (1929) 
Int./Ext. Mixed Mixed 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1  1  5 / 4 
  Knowledge-sharing 1850/1900 Two shipbuilders (1888) Ext./Int. Mixed Mixed 1 1 —  1 1 4 
            
Total (no.)       18   9 / 14 11 / 15 16 / 11 17 / 5 13 / 5 9 / 4 16  14  69 / 21 
Total (%)       100   50 / 78 61 / 83 89 / 61 94 / 63 72 / 63 50 / 50 89  78 77 / 53 
Notes: within the four categories the cash allocation mechanisms are listed in broad chronological order. “Since” does not refer to an exact year but instead refers to the period in which the institution became widespread. The scale and stage for each institution 
have been assessed for the typical R&D-project in the respective category. 
 “1” signifies that the institution mitigates the relevant obstacle; “” signifies that it does not mitigate the relevant obstacle 
Where two values appear, the first reflect the innovator’s perspective, the second the financer’s perspective. 
RDFO = R&D Financing Organisation (see Beatty, Berger and Magliolo 1995). 
For the independent research lab, the obstacles to the commissioner of the research are assessed. 
Internal financing, almost per definition, strongly mitigates the two transactional obstacles. 
Sources: see text; see tables 4 and 5. 
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Conclusion 
We have examined the pattern of aggregate R&D spending in the very long run, since c. 
1750, as well as how firms were able to incur large R&D outlays on particular, highly 
uncertain projects, in the face of substantial financing obstacles, following the historical 
case study approach of Chandler (1962) and the analytical-historical approaches of 
North (1981) and Williamson (1985). The particular R&D-project has been the key unit of 
analysis, and this is what makes this paper distinctive from studies focusing on 
aggregate firm outlays, national outlays or general non-financial aspects of R&D. 
We have noted how the financing of R&D historically was made difficult by five 
challenges: the fact that R&D was characterised by sunk costs, real uncertainty, long 
and open-ended time lags between outlays and pay-offs, adverse selection, and moral 
hazard. The implication of these challenges was that firms needed cash, not capital, for 
R&D-projects. This has been corroborated by our review of studies on contemporary 
R&D-financing which in many instances concluded that firms’ R&D expenditures were 
highly sensitive to cash flow. 
We found that the long-run pattern of R&D spending, both in Britain and the 
United States, revealed sharp growth, often several times faster than GDP-growth, from 
the turn of the century to the 1970s, with subsequent growth being equal to or lower than 
GDP-growth. We also highlighted how little is known about aggregate R&D-expenditure 
before 1900.  
For case studies of particular R&D-projects, we introduced three methods to 
measure project costs. Besides using GDP-deflated costs and costs relative to GDP, we 
introduced the Empire State Index, which uses the GDP-deflated construction costs of 
the Empire State Building as a comparator. We found that even long before 1900 some 
R&D-projects had a non-insignificant scale: eighteenth century projects such as the 
ship’s clock, the spinning jenny and the water frame all required substantial outlays. We 
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also noted the enormous variation in costs and time lags of R&D projects: the costs 
varied between as much as seven orders of magnitude, meaning that the largest project 
in our case set was in the order of one to ten million times bigger than the smallest 
project. The time lag varied from about minus twenty to about plus twenty years. For 
catalytic cracking, aircraft and chemicals we also found some further evidence of the 
low-hanging fruit hypothesis–that R&D-outlays were increasing disproportionately along 
a technological trajectory. We also observed that despite the smaller British home 
market, British firms were able to engage in R&D-projects that were on a similar scale to 
major U.S. projects, such as ICI’s wartime nuclear research, its terylene project and 
Beecham’s semisynthetic antibiotics project. This is consistent with the findings of 
Edgerton and Horrocks (1994) and nuances Mowery and Rosenberg’s (1989) account 
that British R&D was substantially behind that of the United States before 1940. 
The historical facts that aggregate R&D-outlays grew faster than GDP-growth for 
a long time, and that particular large-scale R&D-projects have existed at least since the 
mid-eighteenth century, suggest that, despite the challenges to the financing of R&D, 
firms were able to incur R&D outlays for large and uncertain projects. 
This finding is not unrelated to other work on institutions. Ostrom (1990), for 
example, finds that although classical economic theory predicts that common pool 
resources such as fishing grounds, commons or water supply will be depleted without 
government intervention, communities developed many different ways to govern their 
common pool resources, and that in practice few were depleted. Likewise, we noticed 
how firms and societies in practice proved creative and resourceful in finding solutions to 
what in theory should be an insurmountable financing problem. 
We reviewed a series of cash allocation mechanisms that they developed for this 
purpose over time and that allowed them to sink ever larger amounts of cash in R&D-
projects. We argue that these solutions to R&D-financing often served many other 
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purposes, but that they also allowed firms to finance R&D, and increasingly so after 
1945. Private institutions we reviewed included self-financing by individuals, angel 
investors, free cash flow from existing operations, IPOs, mergers, multinational 
organisations, venture capital and R&D financing organisations. Semi-public and public 
institutions included universities, industry association labs, government labs, 
government R&D-contracts and state-sanctioned monopolies. Legal-institutional 
instruments we reviewed included property rights per se, prizes, patents and knowledge 
sharing. We found that the only institution that mitigated all five obstacles for financer 
and innovator alike was venture capital. The most asymmetric solutions were prizes and 
government contracts: the former left important challenges for the innovator, while the 
latter mitigated few obstacles for the financer (the government). 
 We need to see these solutions in the context of a sharp jump in the size of the 
national market, by more than two orders of magnitude in Britain between 1736 and the 
present, and by more than three orders of magnitude in the United States between 1790 
and today, in the context of new technologies that increased the effectiveness of R&D 
such as the periodic table, systematic soil sampling, the integrated circuit, or DNA-
sequencing (Moser 2012), and, finally, in the context of large public spending increases 
on R&D through which the pubic sector bore part of the sunk costs and minimum project 
outlays. Further research could explore ways to arrive at an estimate of aggregate R&D 
expenditure before 1900, and establish whether the history of R&D in other high-growth 
countries, such as Germany and Japan, fitted the British and American pattern. 
 The main implications of our research are, first, that cash is essential for financing 
R&D-projects: especially in times of financial crises, when the cash supply tends to dry 
up, policymakers might think about how to stimulate R&D. Second, a flexible legal 
framework is conducive for organisational experimentation and so allows firms to 
develop new organisational and contractual arrangements to finance R&D. Some argue 
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that venture capital is relatively important in the United States, Britain and Israel at least 
partially because the common law in those countries affords substantial legal and 
organisational flexibility (Gilson 2001). Third, institutional flexibility is important in order 
to have a law-making and regulation process that can adjust the legal framework and so 
allows for changes over time that can be conducive for R&D. In the United States, for 
example, institutional flexibility allowed relaxed Californian labour laws, the founding of 
the NASDAQ, the loosening of pension fund investment regulation, the relaxation of 
NASDAQ listing requirements, the Bayh-Doyle Act and many other laws and regulations 
that stimulated outlays on R&D. Fourth, by taking the project as unit of analysis and 
looking at the scale of particular historical cases, we hope that with the Empire State 
Index, we have provided an easy, intuitive comparative tool for policy makers, firms and 
academics to get a grip on the relative size of past R&D projects and long-run trends. 
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